IMPACT OF SELF-EXPLANATION AND ANALOGICAL COMPARISON SUPPORT ON LEARNING PROCESSES, MOTIVATION, METACOGNITION, AND TRANSFER by Richey, J. Elizabeth
 IMPACT OF SELF-EXPLANATION AND ANALOGICAL COMPARISON SUPPORT 
ON LEARNING PROCESSES, MOTIVATION, METACOGNITION, AND TRANSFER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
J. Elizabeth Richey 
B.A., B.S., University of Pittsburgh, 2006 
M.S., University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2015 
 
  ii 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
J. Elizabeth Richey 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
May 13, 2015 
and approved by 
Kevin Crowley, Professor, Learning Sciences and Policy, University of Pittsburgh 
Kenneth R. Koedinger, Professor, Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon 
University 
Christian D. Schunn, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh 
 Dissertation Advisor: Timothy J. Nokes-Malach, Associate Professor, Department of 
Psychology, University of Pittsburgh 
 
  i??
  
Copyright © by J. Elizabeth Richey 
2015 
Impact of Self-Explanation and Analogical Comparison Support on  
Learning Processes, Motivation, Metacognition, and Transfer 
J. Elizabeth Richey, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
 
IMPACT OF SELF-EXPLANATION AND ANALOGICAL COMPARISON SUPPORT 
ON LEARNING PROCESSES, MOTIVATION, METACOGNITION, AND TRANSFER 
 
 
J. Elizabeth Richey, PhD 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015 
 
 
 
Research examining analogical comparison and self-explanation has produced a robust set 
of findings about learning and transfer supported by each instructional technique. However, 
it is unclear how the types of knowledge generated through each technique differ, which has 
important implications for cognitive theory as well as instructional practice. I conducted a 
pair of experiments to directly compare the effects of instructional prompts supporting self-
explanation, analogical comparison, and the study of instructional explanations across a 
number of fine-grained learning process, motivation, metacognition, and transfer measures. 
Experiment 1 explored these questions using sequence extrapolation problems, and results 
showed no differences between self-explanation and analogical comparison support 
conditions on any measure. Experiment 2 explored the same questions in a science domain. 
I evaluated condition effects on transfer outcomes; self-reported self-explanation, analogical 
comparison, and metacognitive processes; and achievement goals. I also examined relations 
between transfer and self-reported processes and goals. Receiving materials with analogical 
comparison support and reporting greater levels of analogical comparison were both 
associated with worse transfer performance, while reporting greater levels of self-
explanation was associated with better performance. Learners’ self-reports of self-
explanation and analogical comparison were not related to condition assignment, suggesting 
 iv 
that the questionnaires did not measure the same processes promoted by the intervention, or 
that individual differences in processing are robust even when learners are instructed to 
engage in self-explanation or analogical comparison. 
 v 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
One goal of cognitive science is to examine the cognitive processes that support learning and 
transfer, or the application of knowledge to a new situation or problem. Analogical comparison 
and self-explanation are hypothesized to be two constructive, sense-making instructional 
techniques for acquiring knowledge that transfers (Chi, 2009; Koedinger, Booth, & Klahr, 2013; 
Renkl, 2014; Richey & Nokes-Malach, 2015), and both have shown consistent benefits for 
learning in the laboratory as well as the classroom (for reviews, see Alfieri, Nokes-Malach, & 
Schunn, 2013; Fonseca & Chi, 2011). Both analogical comparison and self-explanation support 
learning of relational features and transfer to new contexts (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007; Alfieri 
et al., 2013; Atkinson, Renkl, & Merrill, 2003; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; 
Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Dellarosa, 1985; Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). While they appear to rely 
on some of the same mechanisms (e.g., inference generation), prior work suggests they also 
operate through different mechanisms (e.g., mental model revision in self-explanation versus 
relational abstraction in analogical comparison) and the exact nature of the knowledge acquired 
through each is not clear. For example, how does each instructional technique promote 
procedural versus declarative knowledge acquisition, and how abstract is the knowledge 
acquired? The answers have important implications for when students should explain or compare 
in class, particularly if there are instructional scenarios to which one approach is better suited 
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than the other. 
Comparing the two techniques could provide answers to these questions. While each 
instructional technique has been studied extensively on its own, little work has directly compared 
the two (Renkl, 2014; cf. Edwards, Williams, Gentner, & Lombrozo, 2014; Gadgil, Nokes-
Malach, & Chi, 2012; Nokes-Malach et al., 2013). Further, the wide variety of tasks, amount of 
scaffolding, and measurement employed in prior work make it difficult to compare across 
experiments examining each technique separately. Consequently, there is little evidence 
available to suggest which instructional technique is most appropriate for particular instructional 
goals (e.g., near or far transfer). The relative dearth of prior comparative work combined with the 
strong foundations established in the separate literatures examining analogical comparison and 
self-explanation pose an opportunity for testing cognitive theories about both processes and 
taking the first steps toward creating an instructional theory that incorporates both. By 
integrating literatures on analogical comparison and self-explanation, I seek to identify 
differences in the types of knowledge each supports. I also investigate measures designed to 
capture individual differences in the degree to which learners engage in these learning processes, 
both spontaneously and when prompted. Direct comparison creates opportunities to identify 
differences, if any, in the knowledge representations acquired through each process, and this 
approach could provide evidence to guide instructors in determining which processes to support 
for certain situations.  
It is also possible that instructions to engage in either analogical comparison or self-
explanation promote use of the other process as well (Edwards et al., 2014; Edwards, Williams, 
& Lombrozo, 2013; Edwards, 2014; Neuman & Schwarz, 1998). For example, comparison often 
involves explicit explanation of features and their relations within examples, and self-explanation 
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invites comparisons between prior knowledge and new information or different pieces of 
information. For these reasons, it is interesting to explore not only the types of knowledge 
supported by instructing learners to engage in either self-explanation or analogical comparison, 
but also the degree to which students report engaging in both of these processes after receiving 
either type of instruction. Thus, the current work aims to directly compare learning outcomes 
when participants receive either self-explanation or analogical comparison support, while also 
exploring new questionnaire measures targeting individual differences in self-explanation and 
analogical comparison. 
I conducted two experiments to assess what is learned and transferred when participants 
are encouraged to engage in either self-explanation or analogical comparison of the same worked 
examples. Experiments 1 and 2 compared knowledge acquired through self-explanation and 
analogical comparison on a series of near-, intermediate-, and far-transfer tasks. Experiment 1 
employed a sequence extrapolation task, which was hypothesized to contain sufficiently rich 
principles to capture cognitive processes and types of knowledge representations similar to those 
employed in academic learning while also affording greater experimental control of knowledge 
types and test items. Experiment 2 aimed to explore the same questions in an ecologically valid 
academic domain. Both experiments examine tasks designed to be equally well suited to self-
explanation and analogical comparison, with similar levels of scaffolding and support offered for 
each instructional technique to facilitate clearer comparison of learning processes and outcomes. 
In the following sections, I review prior research on self-explanation and analogical 
comparison, highlighting findings regarding the types of knowledge and performance each one 
supports and the hypothesized mechanisms thought to explain those findings. I discuss the key 
features compared across instructional techniques in the present work, and then provide 
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conceptual background for the other variables of interest, including metacognition and 
motivation. My examination of these techniques is grounded in the literature on example-based 
learning (Renkl, 2014), with instructional prompts for each condition targeting worked examples 
and a worked example condition with instructional explanations used as a third condition across 
studies. 
This work adopts Barnett and Ceci's (2002) model of transfer distance, which accounts 
for two dimensions of distance, content and context, to determine where a task lies on the 
transfer spectrum in relation to a knowledge source. Transfer can occur across a number of 
different factors within these dimensions (e.g., knowledge domain, temporal context) and its 
distance is a reflection of how different the transfer task is from the initial learning task. 
Different types of transfer are associated with different types of knowledge representations and 
their characteristics. For example, performing well on a near-transfer task suggests the learner 
has acquired procedures and concrete features of the initial task, while performing well on a far-
transfer task suggests the learner has acquired abstract principles that can be flexibly applied to 
new features. This makes transfer an especially useful measure for understanding and 
differentiating the nature of the knowledge representations acquired across conditions.  
In the following experiments, I classify test items based on Barnett and Ceci's (2002) and 
Nokes-Malach et al.'s (2013) models of transfer distance with categories of near, intermediate, 
and far transfer, as well as Bransford and Schwartz's (1999) preparation for future learning. 
Items classified as near transfer involve either identical problem-solving procedures or the same 
surface features or relations (e.g., identical phrases of text) that can cue memory retrieval of prior 
learning materials. Intermediate-transfer items involve the same representations (e.g., structures, 
principles, problem-solving procedures) but may require some abstraction or inference based on 
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changes in surface features. Far-transfer items require the learner to draw inferences and reason 
about new problem features or relations by applying concepts or principles from prior learning 
materials. Finally, preparation for future learning (PFL) is a transfer measure that looks at how 
well a learner is able to acquire and apply knowledge from a new learning resource after initial 
instruction (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz et al., 2005; Schwartz & Martin, 2004). In 
other words, while the other transfer measures look at the application of knowledge to a new 
question, PFL transfer looks at the application of knowledge to a new learning opportunity. 
Knowledge must be increasingly abstract and flexible to facilitate transfer as distance increases, 
meaning that more concrete knowledge should support near transfer while more abstract 
knowledge should support far transfer and PFL.  
1.1 SELF-EXPLANATION 
Self-explanation is a powerful, well-studied learning process that involves generating 
explanations of provided content (e.g., worked examples, instructional text; Atkinson et al., 
2003; Catrambone, 1998; Fonseca & Chi, 2011; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). It is a particular type 
within the broader category of explanations (e.g., instructional explanations, disciplinary 
explanations; Keil, 2006; Leinhardt, 2010). While all explanations share certain features, such as 
generating answers to questions (Edwards, 2014), each type has specific features with 
implications for how they arise, the mechanisms through which they promote learning, and how 
they can be used in instruction. In this section, I review the features of self-explanations, which 
are explanations that learners generate for themselves.  
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1.1.1 Mechanisms that support learning through self-explanation 
Because they are generated with minimal concerns about external evaluation or 
coherence, self-explanations are often incomplete and tailored to the learner’s prior knowledge. 
While this can make self-explanations less accurate according to disciplinary standards, it also 
means that they are especially useful for building and revising a learner’s existing knowledge 
about a domain. Several theories have proposed that self-explanation operates through gap-filling 
and the correction of errors in mental representations of complex concepts (Chi, 2000; Nokes, 
Hausmann, VanLehn, & Gershman, 2011; VanLehn & Jones, 1993). The benefits of self-
explanation seem to be critically linked to the prior or personal knowledge of the learner and the 
process of activating that knowledge to construct explanations (Fonseca & Chi, 2011). For 
example, Hausmann & VanLehn (2010) compared learning outcomes for college students 
instructed either to self-explain or paraphrase the content of the examples they were shown. To 
help students better follow the manipulation instructions, both conditions received brief 
instruction about the nature of self-explanation or paraphrasing and studied student examples 
modeling the behavior. Students instructed to self-explain demonstrated greater learning during 
the intervention, as measured by their proportion of errors and requests for help out of all their 
problem-solving entries. They also required less assistance on related homework problems 
solved after the training intervention, suggesting the instructions to self-explain supported deeper 
learning that facilitated performance after the intervention had ended. These results indicate that 
self-explanation operates not through exposure to additional content, but through the act of 
generating content. 
A primary theoretical argument about the nature and utility of self-explanation suggests 
that learning comes from the process of working through one’s own understanding in relation to 
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new information; based on this explanation, it is less important that the explanations be accurate 
or complete and more important that they involve one’s prior knowledge or understanding. Thus, 
Chi (2000) argued that inaccurate self-explanations should not necessarily reduce learning. Prior 
work has shown that elaborations are associated with better comprehension even when they are 
not accurate (McNamara, 2004), although other results suggested that inaccurate elaborations 
were associated with less procedural learning from examples (Berthold & Renkl, 2009).  
1.1.2 How has self-explanation been studied? 
Self-explanation has primarily been studied through examination of spontaneous 
behaviors and measurement of learning following instructional interventions designed to either 
train or prompt self-explanation. Learners who engage in more self-explanation on their own 
demonstrate better understanding of principles compared to those who engage in less self-
explanation, suggesting that prompting explanation might be a productive avenue for improving 
learning (Chi et al., 1989). Even when explanations are prompted, however, there is still high 
variability in self-explanation quality (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994), suggesting 
that prompting for explanations may not be very effective on its own in promoting the types of 
deep, relational explanations that support robust learning. For example, in a pilot study using a 
cognitive tutor that prompted high school geometry students to explain example problem-solving 
steps, Aleven and Koedinger (2000) reported low success on a variety of measures including 
attempts at explanation, accuracy of explanations, and completeness. The reasons for low-quality 
responses could include low student motivation, uncertainty about how to respond to the 
prompts, limited prior knowledge or instructional content available as a source for explanations, 
and the inherent difficulty of the task. Generating novel explanations is more difficult and error-
  8 
prone than restating information provided through instruction, and so learners may be more 
inclined to paraphrase or generate shallow explanations. 
A number of interventions have tried to address these issues by employing more robust 
self-explanation prompting. Interventions to promote self-explanation can be broadly classified 
as instructional training in self-explanation (Bielaczyc, Pirolli, & Brown, 1995; McNamara, 
2004) or specific prompts to encourage self-explanation (Atkinson et al., 2003; Chi et al., 1994; 
Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Hausmann, van de Sande, & VanLehn, 2008; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). 
The former generally entails instruction about different types of self-explanations and their 
utility, modeling of effective self-explaining, and practice generating self-explanations. Training 
can vary in length from a short tutorial at the start of the lesson (e.g., Hausmann & VanLehn, 
2010) to an extensive series of sessions spanning multiple days.  
Prompting may include some basic practice, modeling, or instruction about the nature of 
self-explanations, but it primarily relies on instructions embedded within learning materials to 
promote self-explanation. Prompts can be specifically tailored to the learning context (e.g., “Can 
you say something about the functions of different parts” in a learning activity about the 
circulatory system; Gadgil et al., 2012) or much more general (e.g., “Explain aloud the reasoning 
or justification for each step of the solution” in a learning activity about physics problem solving; 
Nokes-Malach et al., 2013). Some are open-ended and encourage elaboration, as in the previous 
examples, while other prompts require students to provide the name of a principle or to select a 
principle or another short response from the a list of options (e.g., Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; 
Atkinson et al., 2003). Others combine different types of prompts; for example, Berthold and 
Renkl (2009) employed very detailed prompts targeting specific elements of worked examples 
early on, and then removed scaffolding by switching to open-ended prompts as learners 
  9 
continued to study examples. While the previous examples targeted the information provided in 
the instructional materials, some prompts are focused more directly on monitoring the learner’s 
understanding (e.g., “What parts of this page are new to me? Is there anything I still don’t 
understand?”; Wong, Lawson, & Keeves, 2002), and others prompt activities such as explaining 
how model students arrived at correct or incorrect answers (e.g., “the experimenter asked the 
participant to explain verbally both how the other child had obtained the answer and why each 
answer was correct or incorrect,” Rittle-Johnson, 2006).  
Sometimes learners are prompted to explain verbally (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007; Chi 
et al., 1994; Hausmann, Nokes, VanLehn, & van de Sande, 2009; Neuman & Schwarz, 1998; 
Nokes-Malach et al., 2013; Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998; Rittle-Johnson, 2006; Wong et 
al., 2002), while other times they are prompted to write out their explanations (Berthold & 
Renkl, 2009; Schworm & Renkl, 2006, 2007). Some evidence suggests that the two processes 
might trigger different results. Hausmann and Chi (2002) found that students typed fewer 
spontaneous, unprompted self-explanations and more paraphrasing compared to results in prior 
research examining spontaneous verbal self-explanations. They proposed that the process of 
typing may have led participants to filter their thoughts and focus on writing complete, accurate 
notes, or that the act of typing required more cognitive resources than talking aloud and thus left 
fewer resources available for the constructive processes of self-explanation. However, another 
study comparing spontaneous self-explaining and paraphrasing across modalities found that 
participants did less paraphrasing when typing compared to talking aloud (Muñoz, Magliano, 
Sheridan, & McNamara, 2006). Given that relatively little work has examined the effects of 
verbal and written modalities on learning from self-explanation, and those results have been 
contradictory, it is unclear whether prompting learners to verbalize or write their explanations 
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affects learning.  
Interventions also vary in terms of whether learners receive corrective feedback or 
repeated questioning following incomplete or inaccurate self-explanations (Ainsworth & Loizou, 
2003; Aleven, Popescu, & Koedinger, 2002; Conati & VanLehn, 2000; Neuman & Schwarz, 
1998), or no follow-up prompting beyond the initial prompt to self-explain (Schworm & Renkl, 
2007). For example, Aleven et al.'s (2002) cognitive tutor assessed the completeness and 
accuracy of learners’ self-explanations. In response to incomplete or inaccurate explanations, the 
tutor would provide an additional prompt to foster a more complete or accurate explanation, such 
as “Please add to your explanation or type something different” or “That may not be the right 
number. Can you state the geometry rule that justifies your answer?” In cases where the 
experimenter provides the feedback or questioning, it is typically used when learners fail to meet 
a certain set of criteria with their explanations, such as being incorrect, leaving out important 
points, or remaining silent for too long (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007; Chi et al., 1994; Neuman 
& Schwarz, 1998; Renkl et al., 1998). Both approaches produce similar effects of encouraging 
more elaborate explanations. 
Measurement of self-explanation is generally based on verbal or written protocol analysis 
(e.g., asking participants to talk aloud while studying material and then coding each utterance 
based on whether it is a particular type of self-explanation statement) and outcome measures 
including performance on tests and revision of inaccurate mental models or misconceptions. A 
number of studies have attempted to classify the types of responses students produce, either 
when simply instructed to talk aloud (e.g., Hausmann, Nokes, VanLehn, & van de Sande, 2009) 
or when prompted to self-explain (e.g., Berthold & Renkl, 2009). Although the specific 
categories and features classified have varied across research, most focus on differentiating 
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several dimensions including the degree to which the learner mentions prior knowledge or 
examples, the degree to which the learner explains compared to paraphrasing, and the degree to 
which he or she engages in metacognitive behaviors, typically in the form of monitoring 
understanding. For example, Hausmann et al. (2009) created a coarse-grained coding scheme to 
analyze individuals’ and dyads’ dialogues while studying examples based on how frequently 
they explained, monitored their understanding, mentioned prior knowledge or examples, and 
paraphrased the content of the example they were studying. Berthold & Renkl (2009) coded 
learners’ written responses to self-explanation prompts according to whether they were based on 
identifying and describing underlying principles; providing a rationale for why a principle 
applied; or applying a misunderstanding about principles. Ainsworth and Burcham (2007) 
developed a coding scheme that was based on Renkl's (1997) work and classified explanations as 
referencing underlying principles, referencing a goal or purpose for the information, elaborating 
on the information, assessing the coherence between a new piece of information and previous 
information, and monitoring understanding. Identifying the different types of information 
learners generate when constructing explanations has provided some evidence about which types 
of explanations support learning and consequently provides clues regarding the mechanisms that 
make self-explanation a robust learning process.  
1.1.3 Types of knowledge that self-explanation supports 
The types of knowledge supported by self-explanation depend on both the content being 
explained and the types of explanations the learner generates. Berthold and Renkl (2009) 
examined correlations between their classification of principle-based, rationale-based, and 
incorrect self-explanations and conceptual and procedural knowledge. The authors found that 
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principle-based explanations were correlated positively with only conceptual knowledge, 
incorrect self-explanations were correlated negatively with only procedural knowledge, and 
rationale-based self-explanations were correlated positively with both. Using a different coding 
scheme, Ainsworth and Burcham (2007) found that explanations focused on principles, 
monitoring positive understanding, and paraphrasing were positively correlated with posttest 
performance, while explanations focused on goals, elaborations on the text, noticing coherence 
in the text, and monitoring a lack of understanding were not correlated with performance. Only 
false explanations were negatively correlated with performance. This evidence suggests complex 
relations between the content of explanations and learning, but given the many different coding 
schemes and learning outcomes measured across studies, it is difficult to derive clear distinctions 
about which types of self-explanation support different kinds of knowledge. 
Self-explanation prompts have been applied to a wide variety of instructional materials, 
including text (Chi et al., 1994), diagrams (Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003), and example problems 
(Rittle-Johnson, 2006). While much work has focused on deepening conceptual understanding 
(Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2003; Chi et al., 1989; Gadgil et al., 2012), other 
work has emphasized learning procedures, generalizing them, or connecting them to concepts 
(Aleven, Koedinger, & Popescu, 2003; Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). Some 
evidence suggests that the effects of self-explanation are most powerful on difficult (Chi et al., 
1994) or far-transfer problems (Wong, Lawson, & Keeves, 2002). There is also evidence of the 
learning process itself transferring in the form of self-explanation training or prompting changing 
students’ behaviors in later problem-solving scenarios (Wong, Lawson, & Keeves, 2002).  
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1.2 ANALOGICAL COMPARISON 
Analogical comparison is an instructional technique in which learners receive multiple 
exemplars and engage in mapping features and relations between them, which leads to better 
encoding of abstract relations that can be applied to novel cases (Gentner et al., 2003; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983). Analogical comparison is a particular type of analogical reasoning, which 
entails applying relations from one case or multiple cases to a novel one; however, retrieving an 
appropriate case upon which to base the analogy is a major stumbling block in the process 
(Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Ross & Kilbane, 1997; Sternberg, 1977). In 
the case of analogical comparison, which I review here, the two cases or examples are provided. 
This eliminates potential retrieval failures, and the learning process focuses on identifying 
features and relations within and across the two cases that can then be used to understand novel 
cases. In the following sections, I review the mechanisms through which analogical comparison 
is hypothesized to support learning and the approaches used to examine and test learning through 
analogical comparison. Based on this review, I identify the types of knowledge analogical 
comparison may support, considering both theoretical claims and experimental evidence. 
Through this review, I aim to identify the ways in which analogical comparison might support 
learning and the critical features necessary to obtain positive learning outcomes. 
1.2.1 Mechanisms that support learning through analogical comparison 
Analogical case comparisons that are designed to highlight shared structural features and 
relations can help a learner encode those structural features and relations without the distracting 
surface features that are also present in individual cases (Gentner et al., 2003). A pair of 
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“contrasting cases” should be carefully selected to highlight similarities that are relevant to 
principles shared across cases while reducing emphasis on surface features by minimizing 
superficial similarities (Gick & Paterson, 1992; Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). A schema that 
captures abstract, structural details without superficial features can facilitate transfer to novel 
problems with different surface details but the same structural features, making it more likely 
that a learner who has engaged in case comparison will be able to apply the same principles to a 
new problem in a different context (Gick & Holyoak, 1983).  
1.2.2 How has analogical comparison been studied? 
Much work on analogical comparison has examined the degree to which learners engage 
in it spontaneously and the degree to which it can be successfully prompted or trained. Although 
the learning benefits of analogical comparison have been extensively demonstrated, research has 
shown that there is a great deal of individual variability in the extent to which learners engage in 
analogical comparison spontaneously, and many learners do not make fruitful comparisons even 
when instructed to do so (Gick & Holyoak, 1983).  
Comparisons may be prompted, meaning the learners receive some kind of clue or hint 
that they should identify similarities or differences but no direction regarding which features they 
should focus on. Scaffolding is a more robust approach to prompting, in which learners are not 
only instructed to compare but given clues or explicit instructions about which features and 
relations to align across cases (Gentner et al., 2003). Many prompts take the form of a hint or 
direct instruction to compare (Gick & Holyoak, 1983), identify similarities and/or differences 
between cases (Edwards et al., 2013; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999), select a match 
out of a set of options (Gentner & Namy, 1999), or rate similarity (Markman & Gentner, 1993). 
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Less direct prompts and activities can also be effective in encouraging the learner to engage in 
comparison (Gentner & Medina, 1998), including instructions to elaborate on relations, 
providing perceptual cues to align features or relations (Kolodner, 1997), or using names or 
labels to highlight categories, features, or relations (Graham, Namy, Gentner, & Meagher, 2010; 
Namy & Gentner, 2002). Multiple strategies from prior work were incorporated into the 
materials in the present set of experiments to promote analogical comparison, including 
prompting, modeling, and perceptual alignment. 
While analogical comparison can be a powerful tool for deep learning, a meta-analysis of 
analogical case comparison conducted by Alfieri et al. (2013) showed that several design factors 
were significant moderators of learning outcomes across studies. Specifically, instructing 
learners to focus on similarities was more effective than focusing on both similarities and 
differences, which was more effective than focusing on differences alone. Direct instruction on 
the key principle across cases after the learner engaged in comparison was more effective than 
identifying it before or not at all. Studies tended to report larger effect sizes when examining 
perceptual content compared to procedural content, and when the test was administered 
immediately after the comparison rather than on a subsequent day. In contrast, results did not 
vary between prompted and guided experiments, generated or provided features, or classroom or 
laboratory studies. The ages and experience levels of the learners also did not moderate results 
across studies, suggesting that participants’ levels of prior knowledge may not determine their 
learning outcomes from analogical comparison. The authors found some evidence of a 
significant difference in results depending on whether the domain was math, science, or another 
domain, whether the dependent measure targeted near or far content, and whether the cases were 
rich or minimal, but results were inconsistent. Based on prior literature, it seems less important 
  16 
that learners compare a particular type of information and more important that the information 
being compared shares critical features and relations, reduces emphasis on surface similarities, 
and provides sufficient scaffolding to help the learner focus on important features and relations. 
1.2.3 Types of knowledge that analogical comparison supports 
Measurement of analogical comparison is generally based on transfer outcomes (e.g., if 
the learner successfully transfers an idea from provided examples to a new problem, one may 
infer that analogical comparison has been successful), responses to scaffolded prompts (e.g., a 
participant might be asked to fill in specific features and relations as they align across examples), 
and performance on assessments of learning (Nokes-Malach et al., 2013; Rittle-Johnson & Star, 
2007) or misconceptions (Brown & Clement, 1989; Gadgil et al., 2012). Prior work has shown 
that comparison can support learning of procedures (Rittle-Johnson & Star, 2007), structural 
features and relations (Dellarosa, 1985; Kurtz et al., 2001), and abstract principles (Gentner et 
al., 2003; Novick & Holyoak, 1991). Comparing features and relations supports the encoding of 
abstract information, which may make analogical comparison especially well-suited for 
supporting transfer of knowledge to novel contexts or problems (Alfieri, Nokes-Malach, & 
Schunn, 2013; Gentner et al., 2003; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Conversely, some evidence has 
suggested that it may not be as beneficial as other types of instruction, including self-explanation 
and worked-example study, for facilitating knowledge of specific problem-solving procedures 
(Nokes-Malach et al., 2013). Comparison can also support the correction of misconceptions or 
revision of mental models if cases for comparison are selected to highlight learners’ 
misconceptions, either by asking learners to compare a scientifically accurate model to a flawed 
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model that they hold (Gadgil et al., 2012) or by helping the learner to realize that two 
superficially different cases are instantiations of the same principles (Brown & Clement, 1989).  
1.3 WORKED EXAMPLES 
Across both studies in the current work, the target of learners’ analogical comparisons and self-
explanations were worked examples. Worked examples are problems that include problem-
solving steps and final solutions, and may contain instructional explanations of the steps or 
solutions. Prior work has shown that providing learners with worked examples instead of simply 
giving them problem-solving practice can help them acquire a greater amount of procedural and 
conceptual knowledge and learn more efficiently (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Fong & Nisbett, 
1991; Renkl, 1997, 2005, 2014; Sweller, 1988). Worked examples have been shown to support 
learning across a variety of math and science domains, and theoretical accounts argue that they 
operate through several mechanisms. First, they provide constraints on the solution space by 
highlighting the correct solution path so students do not waste time on incorrect or unfruitful 
searches or encode incorrect solution strategies (Paas, 1992). Second, they are hypothesized to 
reduce irrelevant cognitive load, or the amount of cognitive resources a learner employs during a 
task, by highlighting the important elements of the problem and solution for the learner to focus 
on, encode, and reason about (Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994; Ward 
& Sweller, 1990). Third, by virtue of reducing cognitive load and increasing available working 
memory resources, they are hypothesized to encourage constructive cognitive processes such as 
self-explanation, in which learners explain to themselves the underlying conceptual logic and 
justifications behind each step (Catrambone, 1998; Chi et al., 1989; Renkl, 1997, 2014). 
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Worked examples have often been used as the target of prompts and scaffolding to induce 
analogical comparison (e.g., Gerjets, Scheiter, & Schuh, 2008) and self-explanations (e.g., 
Atkinson et al., 2003; Renkl, 2002). The lower cognitive load associated with worked examples 
means learners are better able to devote sufficient cognitive resources necessary for identifying, 
aligning, and drawing inferences across structural and relational features or generating deep 
explanations and revising existing knowledge.  
1.4 INSTRUCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Worked examples have also been combined with a different type of explanation called 
instructional explanations, which provide explanations of the concepts, principles, or procedures 
applied in the worked example (Leinhardt, 2010; Renkl, 2002; Wittwer & Renkl, 2008). While 
instructional explanations lack some of the advantages of self-explanations, including the 
constructive element of self-explaining and their incorporation of learners’ prior knowledge, they 
offer the potential for greater disciplinary accuracy and completeness than learners may be able 
to generate on their own, which may better address learners’ comprehension issues or help them 
recognize errors in their understanding (Renkl, 2002). Instructional explanations therefore might 
be particularly beneficial in cases in which students lack sufficient prior knowledge to generate 
fruitful explanations or comparisons, or in situations in which inaccurate or incomplete self-
explanations reduce learning (e.g., Berthold & Renkl, 2009). Their utility likely depends on 
factors concerning the content of the instructional explanations, such as whether they focus on 
deep principles or restatement of procedural steps, and on how they are implemented, such as 
whether learners are given opportunities to apply instructional explanations to new problems 
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after receiving them (Wittwer & Renkl, 2008, 2010). 
Evidence regarding the efficacy of instructional explanations has been mixed, with some 
experiments showing an advantage when they are used to support self-explanation (Renkl, 2002) 
or delivered in a computer-based tutoring environment (Atkinson, 2002) and other experiments 
showing reduced or equivalent learning compared to simply studying worked examples (Richey 
& Nokes-Malach, 2013; van Gog, Paas, & van Merriënboer, 2008). A meta-analysis found that 
instructional explanations slightly improved conceptual learning from worked examples but not 
procedural learning, and only in certain domains, suggesting that exposure to principle-based 
explanations can have a positive effect on learning even when they are not self-generated 
(Wittwer & Renkl, 2010). The same meta-analysis failed to find evidence that instructional 
explanations were more effective than self-explanation at supporting learning from worked 
examples, although designs that encourage some form of active processing and application of 
instructional explanations are expected to improve learning (Wittwer & Renkl, 2008). Consistent 
with prior work (Schworm & Renkl, 2006), instructional explanations were embedded in each 
worked example in the following experiments to serve as a comparison condition that suppresses 
spontaneous self-explanation and controls for the amount of information processed across 
conditions while manipulating the processes (i.e., reading explanations, generating self-
explanations, generating comparisons). 
1.5 METACOGNITION 
Metacognition, or the ability to think about one’s own cognitions, is a critical skill for self-
regulated learning (Boekaerts & Corno, 2005; Efklides, 2011; Winne, 1995; Zimmerman, 2000, 
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2011). Several key components of metacognition include monitoring understanding, controlling 
one’s strategies, and evaluating solutions. For an example of monitoring understanding, students 
listening to a teacher’s instruction, reading a text, or solving practice problems benefit from 
being able to recognize when they don’t understand something and what they don’t understand. 
With that recognition, they can ask questions, re-read, or seek out other resources to improve 
their understanding. Otherwise, they might continue with an incomplete or inaccurate 
understanding, which would hurt their comprehension of later lessons building on those ideas as 
well as their performance on homework and exams. An awareness of one’s learning processes 
and how to change them can help a student redirect her efforts if she does not understand a 
lesson or is not moving toward a problem solution; such control can reduce the likelihood of a 
student trying the same, ineffective strategy until eventually giving up. Finally, the ability to 
evaluate one’s solutions helps a learner assess her comprehension at the end of a lesson or a 
portion of a lesson, as well as the accuracy of her answers on a problem-solving task or 
assignment. Students with poor evaluation abilities frequently stop thinking about a problem as 
soon as they arrive at any answer, which prevents them from recognizing flaws or inaccuracies in 
their answers. This leads to missing out on opportunities for error correction and can propagate 
misconceptions, if the student thinks she is getting correct answers or has a complete 
understanding when she does not. 
Metacognition has been studied extensively in classroom and laboratory learning 
environments, and it has been associated with better learning and transfer and more positive 
motivational outcomes (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Veenman, Elshout, & 
Meijer, 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2001; Wolters & Pintrich, 1998). Less work has tested 
interventions to improve learners’ metacognitive skills, although some research has suggested 
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promising effects of metacognitive training on use of metacognitive behaviors as well as 
motivation and near- and far-transfer learning outcomes (Brand, Reimer, & Opwis, 2003; Lin & 
Lehman, 1999; Palinscar & Brown, 1984; Zepeda, Richey, Ronevich, & Nokes-Malach, in 
press). As an alternative to direct instruction of metacognition, I examine whether prompting 
different instructional techniques can have a similar effect of increasing learners’ use of 
metacognition, and whether metacognitive behaviors contribute to the effects of different 
instructional conditions on learning outcomes. Given the mechanisms of prior knowledge 
activation and mental model revision associated with self-explanation, it may be that an 
intervention modeling and prompting self-explanation leads students to increase their use of 
metacognitive processes. I investigate this question in Experiment 2 by assessing students’ self-
reports of metacognition in relation to their instructional condition and learning outcomes. 
1.6 MOTIVATION 
Motivation is associated with a variety of learner behaviors, including the type of study strategies 
learners employ, their learning and transfer of the content being studied, their persistence in the 
face of difficulty, their enjoyment and interest in a course, and their decision to pursue a topic 
either outside the classroom context or in future courses (Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 1999; 
Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Hulleman, Godes, Hendricks, & Harackiewicz, 2010; Hulleman & 
Harackiewicz, 2009; Pintrich & de Groot, 1990; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Pintrich, 2003). 
In addition to reducing learning and performance in a course, poor motivation can have negative 
repercussions on students’ long-term career trajectories. Prior research has shown that students’ 
motivation to do science and math declines during middle school (Collins & Osborne, 2001; 
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Haworth, Dale, & Plomin, 2008; Jarvis & Pell, 2001; Jenkins & Nelson, 2005; Lyons, 2006), 
potentially contributing to the decrease in students who report wanting to pursue science and 
math careers in high school or who actually do so in college and beyond compared to those who 
express interest in middle school. For these reasons, it is important to understand how different 
instructional techniques support changes in motivation.  
One approach for assessing learner motivation is Elliot and colleagues’ achievement 
goals framework (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Elliot & Murayama, 2008). Achievement goals are 
classified along two dimensions. First, the definition of the goal is determined by whether the 
learner makes competency judgments based on intrapersonal or absolute criteria (mastery goal) 
or interpersonal criteria (performance goal). Second, the valence of the goal is determined by 
whether the learner strives to attain positive outcomes (approach goal) or avoid negative ones 
(avoidance goal). These two dimensions are crossed to produce four distinct, though not 
mutually exclusive, goals: mastery approach (e.g., “My aim is to completely master the material 
presented in this class”), mastery avoidance (e.g., “I am striving to avoid an incomplete 
understanding of the course material”), performance approach (e.g., “My goal is to perform 
better than other students”), and performance avoidance (“My aim is to avoid doing worse than 
other students”).  
Prior work has associated each of these distinct goals with different motivations, learning 
behaviors, and outcomes. In general, mastery-approach goals are associated with effective 
learning strategies and positive learning outcomes. Performance-approach goals are associated 
with a mixture of effective and ineffective learning strategies and generally positive learning 
outcomes, while mastery-avoidance goals are associated with a mixture of effective and 
ineffective strategies as well as positive and negative learning outcomes. Finally, performance-
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avoidance goals are associated with ineffective strategy use and negative learning outcomes 
(Ames & Archer, 1988; Elliot et al., 1999; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Howell & Watson, 2007; 
Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010; Linnenbrink-Garcia, Tyson, & Patall, 
2008; Middleton & Midgley, 1997; Roussel, Elliot, & Feltman, 2011). In the current work, I 
focus on achievement goals as a measure of motivation because their relation to multiple levels 
of learning and performance outcomes has been well established in classroom and laboratory 
research, and because they can be framed at both the domain and task level, allowing assessment 
of how instruction changes a learner’s goals for a particular task. Different instructional 
techniques may promote the adoption of different achievement goals. For example, being 
repeatedly prompted to explain may lead students to more strongly endorse mastery-approach 
goals that are consistent with deep processing behaviors, while prompts to study completed 
examples might lead students to more strongly endorse performance-approach goals consistent 
with an emphasis on correct answers. 
 In both studies, I measured achievement goals to assess whether different instructional 
conditions supported students’ adoption of different task-framed achievement goals. Examining 
this question could contribute to theoretical understanding of the nature and mechanisms of each 
instructional technique. It also has practical implications for instructional design. For example, it 
may suggest that instructional approaches are an avenue for shaping and redirecting students’ 
motivations toward more fruitful achievement goals based on the types of learning behaviors and 
outcomes the teacher wishes to promote. 
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1.7 FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNIQUES 
The knowledge representations created by a particular instructional technique have implications 
for understanding when that technique should be supported by the instructor (or selected by the 
student) based on the instructional goals, prior knowledge of the learner, and other affordances of 
the task and environment (Koedinger et al., 2013; Koedinger, Corbett, & Perfetti, 2012; Nokes et 
al., 2011). For example, Nokes et al. (2011) showed that the efficacy of self-explanation prompts 
depends on instructional fit, the idea that there must be alignment among task goals, instructional 
prompts, and the cognitive processes and knowledge representations they support. Along similar 
lines, the knowledge-learning-instruction framework (Koedinger et al., 2012) proposes a 
systematic approach to understanding how processes such as self-explanation or analogical 
comparison facilitate specific learning events, which then interact with and produce changes in 
knowledge. This approach of emphasizing alignment between instruction, learning, and 
outcomes advances the cognitive sciences by shifting focus away from pitting one instructional 
principle against another to find which is “better” and instead emphasizes understanding the 
particular learning events and knowledge features each instruction facilitates. However, while 
this framework outlines the general structure of interactions among instruction, learning, and 
knowledge, there is a great deal of work to done in better understanding the learning events and 
knowledge representations associated with specific instructional principles, particularly in 
comparison to others thought to support similar types of knowledge.  
As discussed in the sections above, there is a great deal of overlap between mechanisms 
thought to support learning through self-explanation and analogical comparison, as well as the 
knowledge that both produce. For example, inference generation is a primary mechanism of 
learning from both analogical comparison and self-explanation. However, there are also critical 
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differences in the hypothesized mechanisms underlying each technique that suggest they might 
support different knowledge representations. For example, analogical comparison seems 
especially well suited for prompting abstract knowledge that transfers, while self-explanation 
seems especially well suited for error correction and revising misconceptions. Analogical 
comparison typically focuses on cases or problems, making self-explanation potentially more 
flexible than analogical comparison but perhaps also less structured. In contrast, self-explanation 
typically focuses on one example at a time, so it may provide a greater opportunity for encoding 
concrete problem features compared to analogical comparison, which could result in better 
memory of specific problem-solving procedures. 
1.7.1 Prior work comparing self-explanation and analogical comparison 
A few past studies have compared directly the learning outcomes supported by analogical 
comparison and self-explanation. Gadgil et al. (2012) found that learners with misconceptions 
were more likely to undergo conceptual change when they compared their own flawed mental 
models to an expert model, as compared to when they were instructed to self-explain the expert 
model alone. While this work highlights the potential for analogical comparison to facilitate 
conceptual change, it may be that the conceptual change was driven by the use of a flawed 
mental model as one of the targets for comparison. In other words, it is unclear whether the 
learning was driven by the process of analogical comparison or by drawing the learners’ 
attention to their own flawed models and misconceptions; in the case of the self-explanation 
condition, the learners’ flawed mental models were not explicitly targeted for self-explanation. 
Nokes-Malach et al. (2013) compared self-explanation and analogical comparison of worked 
examples against worked examples paired with instructional explanations and found that 
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analogical comparison led to less near transfer than self-explanation or instructional explanation 
study. Participants across conditions performed equally well on intermediate transfer measures, 
and the self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions demonstrated a learning 
advantage for far-transfer measures compared to the instructional explanations condition. This 
experiment was conducted in a classroom setting, however, and thus was not able to capture 
more fine-grained behavioral measures (e.g., solution times) that might provide insights into the 
types of knowledge representations constructed through each technique and the factors 
moderating those processes. 
1.7.2 Current studies 
For both techniques, the types of knowledge produced depend a great deal on the design 
of the materials, such as the amount of analogical comparison support provided (Gentner et al., 
2003) or whether self-explanation prompts focus on filling gaps in knowledge or revising mental 
models (Nokes et al., 2011). Comparing the two techniques while controlling for factors such as 
the amount of scaffolding provided and the focus of the prompts could provide evidence for 
claims about the relative support each technique provides for different learning processes and 
outcomes.  
In both of the following experiments, learners received instructional text and worked 
examples. Across both experiments, the prompts supporting analogical comparison or self-
explanation targeted the worked examples. Prior work in both areas has prompted comparison 
and explanation of a variety of targets, including text and examples. However, much evidence 
suggests that the effectiveness of analogical comparison depends on the selection and design of 
the examples a learner is instructed to compare (Gentner, 1983). Therefore, simply instructing a 
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learner to compare across blocks of text would likely prove ineffective unless those blocks of 
text had been carefully written and designed to highlight key structural relations. Creating 
content for comparison with well-aligned structural features is a simpler task with examples, as 
these features can be selected and manipulated more easily.  
Although some work has found greater learning benefits from providing direct instruction 
(Schwartz & Bransford, 1998) or a statement of key principles after prompting learners to 
compare across principles (Alfieri et al., 2013), practical constraints stemming from the nature of 
this experiment made it better to provide direct instruction before each case comparison. 
Specifically, giving direct instruction on each topic before prompting participants to interact with 
the worked examples provided a source of prior knowledge that could be used for generating 
self-explanations or identifying and abstracting structural relations, depending on the condition. 
Thus, each condition had clear targets for the prompts with sufficient resources and scaffolding 
to engage in fruitful comparison or explanation of the examples. For these reasons, I determined 
that targeting worked examples with prompts and including instructional text that preceded the 
examples would be the least likely to introduce a design-based advantage for one instructional 
technique over the other. This design was similar to a number of past studies of analogical 
comparison and self-explanation, as well as other research investigating learning from worked 
examples. 
Often learners engage in spontaneous self-explanation and analogical comparison, and 
prompts to engage in one may inadvertently encourage a learner to engage in the other process as 
well (Edwards, 2014). In both experiments I presented problems sequentially on separate pages 
to minimize spontaneous comparison except in the analogical comparison condition, in which 
examples were presented side-by-side. Instructional explanations were included along with 
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worked examples to discourage spontaneous explanation in a third condition (Hausmann & 
VanLehn, 2010; Schworm & Renkl, 2006). Despite these design decisions, spontaneous 
comparison and explanation might occur to some degree in all conditions, just as the prompts 
were likely to produce great variability in the ways participants responded. Specifically, learners 
prompted to self-explain might also compare the worked example targeted by the prompt to their 
prior knowledge, the content of the instructional materials, and possibly the previous worked 
examples. Participants in the analogical comparison condition might also engage in some degree 
of explanation about why similarities or differences were meaningful. Finally, participants in the 
instructional explanation condition might engage in some degree of both spontaneous 
explanation and comparison. 
However, through these experiments I sought to examine self-explanation and analogical 
comparison as they occur when prompted, and thus attempting to strip away all spontaneous 
behaviors that align with the non-prompted techniques would make the behaviors less authentic 
representations of what learners typically do and might remove critical elements necessary to 
each technique’s success. Analyses of main effects target the differences between outcomes 
based on the learning processes supported by prompts, and not all the learning behaviors that 
might occur in each condition. I included self-reported measures of participants’ learning 
processes to assess individual differences in spontaneous behaviors, and I coded the responses 
written by participants in the analogical comparison and self-explanation conditions to assess 
variability in response quality. 
Although past work comparing the learning outcomes of the two techniques provides 
evidence of different mechanisms, this work needs to be replicated and extended with more fine-
grained measures. There is strong evidence that different instructional techniques can lead to 
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different types of processing and knowledge representations, even if those representations 
produce equivalent levels of accuracy (e.g., Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005; Nokes, 2009). Given that 
the proposed work aims to compare two instructional techniques that have both been shown to 
produce deep understanding (Koedinger et al., 2013; Richey & Nokes-Malach, 2015), it is 
particularly important to include measures capable of capturing differences in underlying 
processes and representations even if accuracy does not differ across conditions. For that reason, 
these experiments included a number of fine-grained measures of knowledge and learning 
processes, which I describe in greater detail in the methods sections below. 
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2.0  EXPERIMENT 1: SEQUENCE EXTRAPOLATION THROUGH ANALOGICAL 
COMPARISON, SELF-EXPLANATION, INSTRUCTIONAL EXPLANATION, AND 
PROBLEM-SOLVING PRACTICE 
Experiment 1 compared fine-grained learning and performance measures from analogical 
comparison and self-explanation of sequence extrapolation problems. Sequence extrapolation 
problems (Figure 1) demonstrate a pattern that must first be identified and then extrapolated to 
continue the sequence, and they have been used in prior work to examine the relation between 
instruction and knowledge representations (Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005; Nokes, 2009).  
 
Figure 1. Sample sequence extrapolation pattern with rules labeled. 
Sequence extrapolation problems are especially well suited to research aimed at 
differentiating the types of knowledge supported by analogical comparison and self-explanation 
because problems can be designed to target different types of knowledge representations. 
Relevant knowledge representations for completing this type of problem include declarative 
knowledge for describing the patterns (e.g., labels for component relations such as “forward 1”), 
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declarative knowledge about strategies for completing the patterns that can range from concrete 
(e.g., “value two, B, increases one letter from value one, A”) to abstract (e.g., “identify the 
period of the sequence by looking for the smallest unit of the pattern”), and procedural 
knowledge about extrapolating patterns (e.g., knowing how to perform an extrapolation once the 
pattern has been identified; Simon, 1972).  
Each of these knowledge representations can also be associated with different levels of 
transfer. I hypothesized that the type of instructional activity learners engaged in (self-
explanation, analogical comparison, unprompted example study, or practice) would predict 
participants’ representations of knowledge, which in turn would predict the speed, accuracy, and 
completion patterns employed on subsequent problems. Detailed predictions are included in the 
methods. 
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3.0  METHOD 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and eight students enrolled in an introductory psychology course were recruited to 
participate for course credit.  
3.2 DESIGN 
The experiment had a between-factors design with four conditions (self-explanation, analogical 
comparison, instructional explanation, and practice). 
3.3 MATERIALS 
3.3.1 Instructional text 
All participants first received an instructional text adapted from Nokes and Ohlsson (2005) that 
introduced the concept of sequence extrapolation problems, discussed four types of sequence 
patterns, and provided strategies for identifying and extrapolating patterns. The text included 
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diagrams of example sequence extrapolation problems along with a narrative text. At the end of 
each page of text, participants rated their understanding of the previous page on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 (“I don’t understand at all”) to 5 (“I understand completely”). 
3.3.2 Training and example problems 
After completing the instructional text, participants received brief training in the instructional 
technique for their condition. Prior work has shown that self-explanation prompts are more 
effective when students receive explicit training in self-explanation (Bielaczyc et al., 1995), and 
instruction of analogical comparison principles could lead to similar effects. Training consisted 
of a short text that introduced the type of activity the learner would complete and emphasized 
that this type of activity had been shown to improve learning (Appendix A). 
Following training, all participants received worked examples of sequence extrapolation 
problems. The problems were organized into two sets, with two worked examples in each set 
representing the same relational patterns but with different letters. In other words, the within-set 
problems differed at the intermediate level (Table 1), supporting more general abstraction across 
the examples. Materials were organized into two separate paper packets, with one set per packet. 
Each condition received different prompts to encourage the targeted instructional activity after 
each step of each worked example (Appendix A). 
 
Table 1.  
Levels of abstraction targeted by learning and test material problems with a simple 
demonstration example. For all examples, base for transfer is ABAB. 
Transfer level Characteristics Example Description of pattern 
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Near transfer Values: different 
Relations: identical 
RSRS Same relations as ABAB: 
forward 1 and repeat 
Intermediate 
transfer 
Values: different 
Relations: quantitatively altered, 
relational structure identical 
RTRT Relations changed to 
forward 2 and repeat 
Far transfer Values: different 
Relations: quantitatively altered, 
different kind of relation, 
different relational structure 
RRPP Relations changed to 
backward 2 and repeat; 
different values related 
 Values: different 
Relations: Pattern includes novel 
type of component relation 
QRRQ Novel mirror-flip relation 
 
Although the examples were identical across conditions, the format and prompting 
differed. Participants in the analogical comparison, self-explanation, and instructional 
explanation conditions receive four step-by-step worked examples of sequence extrapolation 
problems, with each step of the example shown on a different page. Items were organized into 
sets of problems, with two examples and two test items associated with each set. Set membership 
was governed by having the same structural relations across examples, although individual 
examples varied in terms of the surface details and/or quantitative relations. Two additional test 
items were not directly associated with either set. The practice condition received the same initial 
and final problem states (problem and solution) on separate pages, but they did not receive the 
step-by-step solutions. To control for time, instructional explanation and practice conditions 
received two additional examples for each set. Details of each condition are described below. All 
example and test items are presented in Table 2. Odd-numbered examples were seen by 
participants in all four conditions, while even-numbered examples were given only to the 
instructional explanation and practice conditions to control for time. Items were adapted from 
prior research examining levels of transfer using sequence extrapolation problems (Nokes & 
Ohlsson, 2005; Nokes, 2009). 
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Table 2.  
Examples and test items used in Experiment 1. 
Item  Provided sequence Extrapolation Abstraction level Transfer 
Set 1     
Ex. 1  I J H K G S J K I L H T K L J M I U L M Initial example N/A 
Ex. 2 M N L O K W N O M P L X O P N Q M Y P Q All relations identical to E1 Near 
Ex. 3 R T Q V P B S U R W Q C  T V S X R D U W  Some relations identical to E1, 
some quantitative relations 
changed 
Intermediate 
Ex. 4 N P M R L E O Q N S M F P R O T N G Q S Some relations identical to E1, 
some quantitative relations 
changed (all relations identical to 
E3) 
Near (to E3) 
Test 1 E F D G C O F G E H D P G H F I E Q H I  All relations identical to E1 Near 
Test 2 E H D K C O F I E L D P G J F M E Q H K  Some relations identical to E1 or 
E3, some quantitative relations 
changed 
Intermediate 
(quantitative) 
Set 2     
Ex. 5 L M Z M L Y M N X N M W  N O V O N U O P Initial example N/A 
Ex. 6 I J W J I V J K U K J T K L S L K R L M All relations identical to E5 Near 
Ex. 7  E G S G E R F H Q H F P G I O I G N H J Some relations identical to E5, 
some quantitative relations 
changed 
Intermediate 
Ex. 8 M O G O M F N P E P N D O Q C Q O B P R Some relations identical to E1, 
some quantitative relations 
changed (all relations identical to 
E7) 
Near (to E7) 
Test 3 R S F S R E S T D T S C T U B U T A U V All relations identical to E5 Near  
Test 4 D A Q A D P E B O B E N G I M I G L I K Some relations identical to E5 or 
E7, some quantitative relations and 
directions changed 
Intermediate 
(quantitative 
and values) 
Test 5 B C P X Y O C D N  1) Y Z M D E K Z A 
2) W X M D E L V W 
1) Surface similarity: new 
combination of familiar 
quantitative relations 2) Deep 
analogy: creation of new rule 
(mirror-flip alphabet) based on 
relations in E5-8 
Far 
Test 6 B A C B E D H G  L K Q P W V D C Novel rule (forward n+1) Far 
3.3.2.1 Self-explanation 
Participants in the self-explanation condition viewed the problems sequentially with one step 
shown at a time, accompanied by a prompt to write an explanation of the step (Figure 2). 
Materials primarily employed the strategy of eliciting self-explanation through direct prompting, 
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and the language in the prompts was adapted from prior work that successfully prompted self-
explanation (Hausmann & VanLehn, 2010; Wong et al., 2002). Each page provided space for 
participants to write their responses to the questions below the example.  
 
Figure 2. Worked example steps formatted for the self-explanation condition. 
The self-explanation prompts were expected to focus learners on the surface features and 
relations in each example. The degree to which learners studied surface features should be 
associated with time on near-transfer test problems, which have the same concrete relations 
shown in the examples. Self-explanation prompts also should encourage generalization about 
types of relations and procedures to the extent that learners used their prior knowledge to make 
sense of the examples. This more general knowledge should increase accuracy and reduce time 
on intermediate-transfer problems, though it may not help learners generate the novel relations 
required for the far-transfer problems. It should also support more variety in the completion 
patterns employed. Learners may use the examples to fill in gaps in their prior knowledge or 
correct errors in their understanding of general strategies, which will support accuracy across all 
problems, including the novel-relation problem. 
3.3.2.2 Analogical comparison 
Participants in the analogical comparison condition saw the parallel steps of both examples in a 
set at once, with instructions to identify the similarities and differences between each pair of 
steps (Figure 3). The examples in Figure 3 highlight the same rule, backward 1, across both 
examples (same quantitative relation), though the rule is instantiated with different letters 
(different surface features). Other elements of the comparison, such as the letters LM and EG at 
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the beginning of the sequences, illustrated the same structural relation (the second letter of the 
pattern is forward n from the first letter) but instantiated it with different letters (different surface 
features) and different quantitative relations (forward 1 and forward 2).  
 
Figure 3. Worked examples steps formatted for the analogical comparison condition. Other 
conditions received the same steps separately, one example sequence at a time. 
Participants were instructed to write their responses to the prompts in the space provided 
on each page. The instructional materials incorporated several strategies for encouraging 
structural comparison. In addition to the explicit instructions to compare, the materials used 
perceptual cues to emphasize alignment by presenting each pair of examples next to each other, 
with aligned steps directly above or below each other. Labels identifying structurally aligned 
steps also built on prior work investigating ways to promote comparison. The analogical 
comparison prompts were designed to focus learners on the abstract structure of component 
relations shared across the two worked examples. In other words, rather than encoding the 
quantitative relations (e.g., that the second value is “Forward 1” from the first value), learners 
were expected to encode the structural relation (e.g., that the second value is Forward X from the 
first value). This abstract, structural knowledge could be more easily applied to intermediate- and 
far-transfer problems, potentially leading to less time required on those problems and greater 
variety in completion patterns. The prompts also focused learners on the general strategies for 
identifying patterns common across the two examples (e.g., first identify the period of the 
pattern), which should support accuracy across all problems, including the far-transfer problems.  
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3.3.2.3 Instructional explanation 
Participants in the instructional explanation condition viewed the problems sequentially with one 
step shown at a time, but instead of prompts they received instructional explanations of each step 
(Figure 4). Participants saw the same four problems included in the analogical comparison and 
self-explanation materials, but to control for time on the task, they saw an additional four 
problems. Each of the additional problems was isomorphic to one of the four examples all 
participants received (i.e., identical quantitative relations to examples included for other 
conditions, but different letters). Similar to the self-explanation prompts, studying the worked 
examples and instructional explanations was hypothesized to encourage encoding of surface 
values and relations, which would facilitate faster times on near-transfer problems.  
Participants were expected to encode the specific pattern detection and extrapolation 
procedures illustrated in the worked examples. Applying identical problem-solving procedures to 
different problems should lead to slower and less accurate solutions compared to learners who 
have knowledge of more general strategies and procedures, resulting in slower times on 
intermediate- and far-transfer problems. Similarly, knowledge of problem-solving procedures 
should be easily applied only to near-transfer problems, resulting in faster times on the near-
transfer problems and having no effect on solution times for of other patterns. 
 
Figure 4. Sample of instructional explanation paired with worked example in the instructional 
explanation condition. 
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3.3.2.4 Practice 
Participants in the practice condition received each example problem without solution steps, with 
the solution to each problem provided on the page immediately after the problem. Participants 
were instructed to solve each sequence extrapolation problem to the best of their ability, and then 
turn to the next page to study the solution. As with the instructional explanation condition, 
participants in the practice condition received an additional four problems, each of which was 
isomorphic to one of the examples seen by all conditions. 
 Participants were expected to encode the procedural features of the examples and the 
connections between the steps. This knowledge will result in high accuracy and speed on near-
transfer problems. Practicing sequence extrapolation and studying solutions should lead to less 
knowledge about structural features and relations compared to conditions that saw, compared, or 
explained worked example steps. Consequently, practice should not perform as well on 
intermediate- and far-transfer items. Practice should also have little impact on the revision of 
errors, resulting in less error-correcting behavior. 
3.3.3 Test materials 
The test consisted of sequence extrapolation problems requiring varying levels of transfer 
including near transfer, intermediate transfer, and far transfer (Table 2). Each set of examples 
was associated with two test problems: one near-transfer problem with quantitative relations 
identical to the initial problem examples but different letter values, and one intermediate-level 
transfer problem with quantitative relations that were altered from the examples (e.g., a “forward 
1” relation was changed into a “forward 2” relation) but the same underlying structure (e.g., 
values in positions 1, 3, and 5 have a forward or backward quantitative relation). Two far transfer 
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problems relied on a new combination of familiar quantitative relations (test item 5) and a new 
rule that participants had not practiced (test item 6). Test item 5 had multiple possible solutions, 
including one that applied familiar relations illustrated in many of the examples and one that 
abstracted a relation illustrated in set 2 to generate a new variation on the relation (i.e., mirror 
flip to mirror-flip alphabet).  
The two near-transfer items differed from the example problems in the same ways 
(identical relations, new surface features) and were analyzed together as a single measure of near 
transfer. The two intermediate-transfer items were analyzed separately because they differed 
from the example problems in different ways (item 2 had different quantitative relations but in 
the same direction, i.e., “forward 1” vs. “forward 3,” while item 4 had different quantitative and 
directional relations, i.e., “forward 1” vs. “backward 3”). The two far transfer items were also 
analyzed separately because they differed from example items in different ways (item 5 required 
a novel combination of familiar quantitative relations, while item 6 required the discovery of a 
novel rule). 
Test materials were coded and analyzed based on accuracy (i.e., how many of the eight 
correctly extrapolated letters participants produced for each test item), solution time (i.e., how 
long participants spent from when they advanced to a new problem to when they submitted their 
response), and completion patterns (i.e., the position order in which they extrapolated the 
sequence). The most basic completion pattern is 12345678, in which the learner extrapolates 
each value in order from left to right. However, more effective patterns often involve 
extrapolating one rule at a time (see Figure 3; this example has been extrapolated in the order of 
positions 1736). In other words, if learners are extrapolating patterns based on one rule at a time 
(e.g., follow “Forward 1” to fill in every three letters, and then follow “backward 1” to fill in 
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every five letters), they will extrapolate letters out of order. If they apply the surface or structural 
relations found in the prior examples (near or intermediate transfer), they may use more common 
extrapolation patterns by filling in one practiced rule at a time. If they are reasoning about 
relations by applying conceptual knowledge to construct new rules, they may use more unique 
extrapolation patterns. Finally, participants’ metacognitive evaluation behaviors were analyzed 
based on the amount of time they spent between entering the final letter of each solution and 
submitting their responses. Their error-correcting behaviors will be assessed based on the 
number of times they change any letters in each response. Table 3 presents hypotheses regarding 
the different measures. 
 
Table 3.  
Targeted knowledge and predictions for each measure in Experiment 1. 
Measures Predictions Knowledge targeted 
Near transfer  Surface-level abstraction 
Accuracy AC=SE=WE=P Declarative knowledge of example pattern 
relations; procedural knowledge for detecting 
and extrapolating patterns 
 
Solution time P<SE=WE<AC 
Intermediate 
transfer 
 Intermediate-level abstraction 
Accuracy AC=SE>WE>P Declarative knowledge of example structures; 
procedural knowledge for detecting and 
extrapolating patterns 
 
Solution time  AC=SE<WE=P 
Far transfer  Structural-level abstraction 
Accuracy AC=SE>WE>P Declarative knowledge of abstract relations 
and strategies Solution time AC<SE<WE<P 
Use of   
Completion pattern 
variety 
 
AC=SE>WE>P 
Error correction  Metacognitive monitoring 
Changes to solution SE>AC=WE>P Declarative knowledge of monitoring/error-
correction strategies Checking time SE>AC=WE>P 
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3.3.4 Questionnaires 
Participants responded to a series of questionnaires targeting their motivation and 
learning processes throughout the experiment. Each instructional condition was expected to 
influence the types of goals participants experienced during the learning phase, such that their 
goals would align with the types of knowledge emphasized by each technique. Conditions were 
also expected to influence the learning processes participants reported using, with participants’ 
self-reports of learning processes aligning with the mechanisms underlying the technique they 
were prompted to use. Predictions are discussed in greater detail below.   
3.3.4.1 Task-framed Achievement Goals Questionnaire 
Elliot and colleagues’ Achievement Goals Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R; Elliot & 
Murayama, 2008) was modified slightly to assess participants’ self-reported goals at the task 
level. Specifically, the instructions asked participants to consider their feelings about the 
activities they completed during the session. The questionnaire assessed participants’ self-
reported endorsement of task-level mastery-approach (.75), mastery-avoidance (.76), 
performance-approach (.91), and performance-avoidance goals (alpha). Responses were recorded 
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Given the 
emphasis that explanation places on understanding, I expected participants in the self-
explanation condition to report greater levels of mastery goals. Since practice emphasized 
arriving at correct solutions, I expected participants in the practice condition to report greater 
levels of performance goals. 
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3.3.4.2 Learning processes questionnaire 
Participants responded to a 10-item learning processes questionnaire about the different 
processes they reported using during the learning and test phases (Table 4). Participants 
responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Unsure”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”). Items 
framed around the learning phase were designed to capture the range of behaviors directly 
encouraged by the prompts (e.g., explanation, comparison) as well as mechanisms thought to 
result from such behaviors (e.g., inference generation, error correction). Items framed around the 
test phase were designed to assess whether learners reported continuing to engage in the 
behaviors encouraged during the learning phase once the prompts were removed.  
 
Table 4.  
Learning processes questionnaire items and the level at which they were framed. 
Framing Prompt Prediction 
Learning 
phase 
I compared what I saw in the problem packets to what I 
already knew from the tutorial. 
SE > AC = WE = P 
 I focused on the procedures I was learning. P = WE > SE > AC 
 I explained the material to myself.  SE > AC = WE = P 
 I compared ideas or examples to one another. AC > SE = WE = P 
 I generated inferences about the material. SE = AC > WE = P 
 I corrected errors in my thinking. SE > WE > AC = P 
 I tried to identify the critical features of the problems. SE = AC > WE > P 
Test 
phase 
I tried to recognize patterns I had already seen. WE = P > SE > AC 
I compared the test problems to what I had seen in the 
learning packets. 
SE = AC > WE = P 
 I explained the problems to myself. SE > AC = WE = P 
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3.4 PROCEDURE 
Participants completed the experiment individually in sessions of three to five students at a time. 
All participants received the instructional text and were given six minutes to complete it. 
Participants then received the learning materials for their conditions, which were distributed in 
two packets with each set of examples in a separate packet. Participants were given 11 minutes 
to complete each packet and were encouraged to use the entire time to study and complete the 
materials. To decrease the likelihood of spontaneous comparison, participants were not permitted 
to flip back once they had completed a page in the learning packet. The test phase began after the 
completion of both learning packets and was presented on computers using PsyScope software 
(J. D. Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Participants first completed a basic practice 
test problem to familiarize themselves with the computer interface. They were given four 
minutes to complete each test problem. 
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4.0  RESULTS 
Participants’ accuracy, time, and completion patterns for each test problem were assessed. 
Performance was assessed using averages for near-transfer and intermediate-transfer problems; 
the two far-transfer problems were analyzed separately, as they involved different levels of 
abstraction and novel-rule generation. Error-correcting behaviors were analyzed based on the 
average number of times participants changed a response once they had entered a value and the 
average amount of time recorded after participants completed each pattern but before submitting 
it. I set the alpha level at .05 for main effects, interactions and planned comparisons, used 
Tukey’s HSD test for post hoc comparisons, and report marginal effects for p values between .05 
and .10 (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). I report effect sizes (Cohen's d or partial eta squared, ηp2) for 
all significant main effects, interactions, and planned comparisons and interpret effects as small 
when ηp2 < .06 or d < .2, medium when .06 < ηp2 < .14 or .3 < d < .8, and large when ηp2 > .14 or 
d > .8 (see Cohen, 1988; Olejnik & Algina, 2000). 
4.1.1 Learning materials completion and accuracy 
I examined participants’ completion of learning materials across several measures to assess 
whether they felt they understood the materials, had sufficient time to complete them, and 
demonstrated understanding. First, I assessed participants’ self-reports of understanding the 
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instructional text, which were collected on a 5-point Likert scale at the end of each page of the 
text for a total of nine reports. Participants’ average reports of understanding were calculated 
across individual prompts. Participants reported experiencing a high level of understanding (M = 
4.71, SD = .44), with mean understanding falling just below a rating of “I understand 
completely.” There were no differences in self-reported understanding across conditions, F(3, 
105) = 1.08, p = .36, η2p = .030. 
Participants were prompted to interact with the examples in different ways depending on 
condition (i.e., practice condition solved problems, instructional explanation condition studied 
examples and explanations with no prompts to write anything, and self-explanation and 
analogical comparison were prompted to write responses), so no between-condition comparisons 
of example material activities were possible. Instead, I examined descriptives of behaviors within 
each condition.  
For the self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions, in which participants 
received prompts to respond to each step of each example, I assessed the average proportion of 
prompt responses for each condition. Participants in the self-explanation condition responded to 
the majority of the prompts in the example packets (M = .93, SD = .12). Of the 27 participants in 
the self-explanation condition, 10 left the final page of the first packet blank and three left the 
final page of the second packet blank, suggesting that most participants in the self-explanation 
condition were able to complete all materials within the allotted time. Participants in the 
analogical comparison condition responded to the majority of the prompts in the example 
packets (M = .94, SD = .088). Of the 28 participants in the analogical comparison condition, 
seven left the final page of the first packet blank and three left the final page of the second packet 
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blank, suggesting that most participants in the analogical comparison condition were able to 
complete all materials within the allotted time. 
Participants in the instructional explanation condition were not prompted to respond to 
any of the example content, and on average they made marks or notes on a very small portion of 
the example pages (M = .06, SD = .17). Eight out of 27 participants made at least one mark or 
note in the example packet, meaning the majority did not mark up the materials at all. Finally, 
participants in the practice condition were instructed to solve each example to the best of their 
ability before turning to the next page and viewing the solution. Extrapolations for each problem 
were coded based on the number of correct extrapolations made out of the eight letters they were 
asked to extrapolate for each problem. On average, participants correctly extrapolated about half 
of the letters across problems (M = 4.41, SD = 2.53). 
4.1.2 Test accuracy 
Participants received accuracy scores based on the number of correct extrapolations made out of 
eight possible extrapolations. A one-way ANOVA was conducted examining the effect of 
condition on accuracy across both near-transfer problems (Figure 5). There was a medium effect 
of condition on near-transfer problem accuracy, F(3, 105) = 2.77, p = .045, η2p = .073; a Tukey 
post hoc analysis revealed a significant difference only between the instructional explanation (M 
= .87, SD = .24) and practice conditions (M = .65, SD = .35; p = .042). There were no differences 
between instructional explanation and self-explanation conditions (M = .77, SD = .27; p = .64), 
instructional explanation and analogical comparison conditions (M = .69, SD = .33; p = .14), 
self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions (p = .77), self-explanation and practice 
conditions (p = .45), or analogical comparison and practice conditions (p = .95).  
  48 
A one-way ANOVA assessing the effect of condition on accuracy on the intermediate-
transfer problem with quantitative relation changes revealed no effect, F(3, 105) = 1.82, p = .15, 
η2p = .049. There was a marginal effect of condition on accuracy on the intermediate-transfer 
problem with quantitative and directional relation changes, F(3, 105) = 2.15, p = .098, η2p = .058; 
a Tukey post hoc analysis no differences between any of the conditions (ps > .12). 
The far-transfer problem that required a new combination of familiar structural relations 
had multiple solutions, including one that involved deep analogy to a prior example 
(transformation of the mirror-flip rule  into a mirror-flip cross-alphabet rule) and one that 
involved closer surface similarity to example problems (application of the “forward X” and 
“backward X” rules in a new pattern). There were no effects of condition on accuracy based on 
the surface-similarity solution, F(3, 105) = .40, p = .75, η2p = .011. Only four participants 
attempted the solution based on a deep analogy to prior examples (two in the instructional 
explanation condition, one in practice, and one in analogical comparison), so no further analyses 
were conducted using the deep analogy solution as the criterion for accuracy. There was no 
effect of condition on accuracy on far-transfer problem that required generation of novel 
relations (the “forward n + 1” rule), F(3, 105) = 1.03, p = .38, η2p = .029. 
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Figure 5. Accuracy by problem type across conditions. 
4.1.3 Solution times 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted to examine the effect of condition on the time in 
seconds that participants spent on each problem (Figure 6). There were no differences among 
conditions in time on near-transfer problems, F(3, 103) = .88, p = .46, η2p = .025, the 
intermediate-transfer problem with quantitative relation changes, F(3, 104) = .58, p = .63, η2p = 
.016, or the intermediate-transfer problem with quantitative and directional relation changes, F(3, 
103) = 1.44, p = .24, η2p = .040. There was a medium effect of condition on time on the far-
transfer problem that required a new combination of familiar structural relations, F(3, 104) = 
3.81, p = .012, η2p = .099; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a significant difference only 
between the instructional explanation (M = 180, SD = 38.8) and practice conditions (M = 128, 
SD = 45.4; p = .006). There were no differences between instructional explanation and self-
explanation conditions (M = 151, SD = 50.5; p = .26), instructional explanation and analogical 
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comparison conditions (M = 158, SD = 82.2; p = .48), self-explanation and analogical 
comparison conditions (p = .97), self-explanation and practice conditions (p = .43), or analogical 
comparison and practice conditions (p = .21).  
 
 
Figure 6. Solution times in seconds by problem type across conditions. 
4.1.4 Detection times 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of condition on the time in 
seconds that participants spent detecting the patterns for each problem (Figure 7). There was a 
marginal difference among conditions in detection time on near-transfer problems, F(3, 105) = 
2.48, p = .065, η2p = .066; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a marginal difference only between 
the instructional explanation (M = 33.1, SD = 24.8) and analogical comparison conditions (M = 
50.5, SD = 30.5; p = .059). There was a marginal difference among conditions in detection time 
on the intermediate-transfer problem with quantitative relation changes, F(3, 105) = 2.33, p = 
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.078, η2p = .062; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a marginal difference only between the 
instructional explanation (M = 22.1, SD = 20.6) and practice conditions (M = 44.1, SD = 42.3; p 
= .059). There was a marginal difference among conditions in detection time for the 
intermediate-transfer problem with quantitative and directional relation changes, F(3, 105) = 
2.43, p = .069, η2p = .065; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a marginal difference only between 
the instructional explanation (M = 18.9, SD = 14.1) and analogical comparison conditions (M = 
30.9, SD = 15.8; p = .050). There was a large effect of condition on time on the far-transfer 
problem that required a new combination of familiar structural relations, F(3, 105) = 5.86, p = 
.001, η2p = .14; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a significant difference between the 
instructional explanation condition (M = 65.4, SD = 38.1) and all other conditions (analogical 
comparison, M = 39.5, SD = 32.6, p = .008; self-explanation, M = 38.4, SD = 24.5, p = .006; 
practice, M = 36.2, SD = 19.6, p = .002). There was no effect of condition on detection time for 
far transfer problem that required generation of a novel rule, F(3, 105) = 1.16, p = .33, η2p = .032.  
 
Figure 7. Detection times in seconds by problem type across conditions. 
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4.1.5 Extrapolation times 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted to examine the effect of condition on the time in 
seconds that participants spent extrapolating the patterns for each problem (Figure 8). There was 
a medium effect of condition on extrapolation time on near-transfer problems, F(3, 105) = 3.22, 
p = .026, η2p = .084; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed differences between the instructional 
explanation condition (M = 118.4, SD = 41.8) and both the self-explanation condition (M = 86.7, 
SD = 49.1; p = .050) and the practice condition (M = 85.5, SD = 41.1; p = .039). There were no 
effects of condition on extrapolation time on the intermediate-transfer problem with quantitative 
relation changes, F(3, 105) = 1.71, p = .17, η2p = .042, the intermediate-transfer problem with 
quantitative and directional relation changes, F(3, 105) = 1.24, p = .30, η2p = .034, the far-
transfer problem that required a new combination of familiar structural relations, F(3, 105) = 
1.06, p = .37, η2p = .029, or the far transfer problem that required generation of a novel rule, F(3, 
105) = 1.07, p = .36, η2p = .030.  
 
Figure 8. Detection times in seconds by problem type across conditions. 
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4.1.6 Completion patterns 
Patterns were classified either as basic (completing the pattern from left to right, i.e., 12345678), 
common (someone else in the same condition used the same completion pattern), or unique (no 
one else in the same condition used the same pattern; Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005). I examined the 
completion patterns participants employed when solving each problem as a measure of whether 
they were applying knowledge of surface or structural relations (common pattern, near or 
intermediate transfer) or applying knowledge of principles to generate new knowledge of 
relations (unique pattern, far transfer). Completion patterns were coded only if the participant 
entered values for all eight extrapolations on a given problem. I conducted a series of chi-squared 
tests to assess whether participants’ use of the three types of completion strategies differed for 
each problem by condition. In the case of any significant tests, I examined adjusted standardized 
residuals in accordance with MacDonald and Gardner (2000) and identified any cells with 
residuals greater than + / - 3 as having a greater or smaller number of participants using that 
pattern than would be expected by chance. There was a marginal difference in strategies across 
conditions for the first near-transfer problem, Χ2(6, N = 102) = 11.27, p = .080; however, no cells 
had an adjusted standardized residual greater than + / - 3. There were no differences across 
conditions for the second near-transfer problem, Χ2(6, N = 106) = 5.00, p = .54, the first 
intermediate-transfer problem, Χ2(6, N = 101) = 3.77, p = .71, the second intermediate-transfer 
problem, Χ2(6, N = 107) = 2.80, p = .83, or the first far-transfer problem, Χ2(6, N = 101) = 8.87, 
p = .18. There was a significant difference across conditions for the second far transfer, Χ2(6, N 
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= 92) = 27.99, p < .01, which required generation of a novel relation. The cell for participants in 
the practice condition who used a common pattern had an adjusted standardized residual of 3.9, 
indicating that more participants than would be expected by chance used a common pattern in 
the practice condition. The cell for participants in the practice condition who used a unique 
pattern had an adjusted standardized residual of -3.7, indicating that fewer participants than 
would be expected by chance used a unique pattern in the practice condition. 
4.1.7 Error correction 
To test whether self-explanation led to greater emphasis on checking and correcting errors, I 
examined the number of times each participant changed a response during the test phase 
(response change; Figure 9) and the amount of time spent after entering the final letter of the 
sequence before submitting the response (check time). A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed 
no differences between conditions in the number of response changes for near-transfer problems, 
F(3, 105) = .56, p = .64, η2p = .016, the first intermediate-transfer problem, F(3, 105) = .58, p = 
.63, η2p = .016, the second intermediate-transfer problem, F(3, 105) = 1.30, p = .28, η2p = .036, 
the first far-transfer problem, F(3, 105) = 1.27, p = .29, η2p = .035, or the second far-transfer 
problem, F(3, 105) = 1.19, p = .32, η2p = .033. 
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Figure 9. Mean number of changes to final extrapolation pattern by condition 
The check time analyses examined check times only using items for which a participant 
submitted a complete response. On items where participants did not submit a complete response, 
they likely ran out of time and therefore did not have an opportunity to check their answers. An 
average check time per problem was calculated for each participant, using only check times for 
completed patterns. A one-way ANOVA revealed no effects of condition on average check time 
across problems, F(3, 105) = .30, p = .82, η2p = .009. 
4.1.8 Achievement goals 
To assess whether different learning conditions prompted participants to endorse different task-
framed achievement goals, I conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs (Figure 10). Analyses 
revealed a medium effect of learning condition on participants’ endorsement of mastery-
avoidance goals, F(3, 105) = 3.41, p = .020, η2p = .089; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a 
significant difference only between the practice (M = 4.17, SD = 1.37) and analogical 
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comparison conditions, (M = 5.13, SD = 1.08; p = .040). There were no differences between 
practice and self-explanation conditions (M = 4.93, SD = 1.16, p = .16), practice and instructional 
explanation conditions (M = 4.31, SD = 1.61, p = .98), analogical comparison and self-
explanation conditions (p = .94), analogical comparison and instructional explanation conditions 
(p = .10), or self-explanation and instructional explanation conditions (p = .32).  
There was also a medium effect of condition on endorsement of performance-approach 
goals, F(3, 105) = 3.00, p = .034, η2p = .079; a Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a significant 
difference only between the practice (M = 5.17, SD = 1.40) and instructional explanation 
conditions, (M = 3.88, SD = 1.74, p = .020). There were no differences between practice and 
self-explanation conditions (M = 4.33, SD = 1.84, p = .23), practice and analogical comparison 
conditions (M = 4.40, SD = 1.43, p = .30), analogical comparison and self-explanation conditions 
(p > .99), analogical comparison and instructional explanation conditions (p = .62), or self-
explanation and instructional explanation conditions (p = .73). 
There were no effects of condition on mastery-approach goal endorsement, F(3, 105) = 
.31, p = .82, η2p = .009, or on performance-avoidance goal endorsement, F(3, 105) = 2.05, p = 
.11, η2p = .055. 
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Figure 10. Condition effects on achievement goal endorsement. 
 Although each item on the learning and test processes questionnaire targeted a different 
behavior, all processes were expected to be correlated. To test the effect of condition on the sum 
of variables, I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Results indicated a 
marginal multivariate effect of condition, Wilks’ λ = .67, F(3, 105) = 1.39, p = .090, η2p = .13. 
Follow-up univariate analyses were conducted using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels .005 per 
test (.05/10). Results indicated a large effect on the learning phase item, “I compared what I saw 
in the problem packets to what I already knew from the tutorial,” F(3, 105) = 7.24, p < .001, η2p 
= .17. A Tukey post hoc analysis revealed a significant difference between the practice condition 
(M = 5.07, SD = 1.94) and the self-explanation (M = 6.37, SD = .79; p = .001), analogical 
comparison (M = 6.36, SD = .78; p = .001), and instructional explanation conditions (M = 6.26, 
SD = .98; p = .003), with the practice condition reporting lower levels of comparison. There were 
no differences between the self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions (p > .99), the 
self-explanation and instructional explanation conditions (p > .99), or the analogical comparison 
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and instructional explanation conditions (p > .99). There was no effect of condition on any other 
questionnaire item, Fs < 2.31, ps > .080.  
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5.0  DISCUSSION 
Analyses of the learning materials showed that in general, participants across conditions had 
sufficient time to complete the materials and made some effort to respond when prompted to do 
so. The absence of a performance measure collected during the learning phase for three of the 
four conditions meant analyses could not be focused on only those participants who had 
successfully learned from the instruction (e.g., the top two-thirds of learning performance), as 
was done in some prior work (Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005). Most instruction includes some form of 
practice, so adding practice to the experimental design would also be pragmatically relevant for 
instructional practices. 
Overall, few condition effects were detected, with no differences between analogical 
comparison and self-explanation. The only difference in test accuracy was detected between the 
instructional explanation and practice conditions on near-transfer problems, with the 
instructional explanation condition achieving a greater level of accuracy. Although this was not 
consistent with predictions, prior work has shown that instructional explanations can support 
learning, particularly when learners are unable to identify critical concepts to focus on when 
engaging self-explanations or comparison (Berthold & Renkl, 2009; Renkl, 2002). The 
instructional explanations focused learners on key strategies and underlying structures in the 
sequence extrapolation problem examples. The examples supplied a great deal of surface 
information that varied across problems, and learners who did not receive instructional 
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explanations may have struggled to see past the surface information when generating 
explanations or comparisons.  
There was also a difference between the instructional explanation and practice conditions 
on time required to solve the first far-transfer problem. The practice condition solved the 
problem more quickly, which was consistent with expectations that participants in the practice 
condition would acquire more procedural knowledge that supports quicker problem solving. 
However, it was not expected that such procedural knowledge would be useful on far-transfer 
items, and it is surprising that no such difference was detected on near-transfer items. Accuracy 
of participants in the practice condition was not greater than in the other conditions on the first 
far-transfer problem, so while they were solving more quickly, they may have just been giving 
up faster or not evaluating their work as carefully. 
Completion pattern results were also somewhat inconsistent with hypotheses. Participants 
in the practice condition, which was expected to promote greater procedural knowledge, used 
more common patterns and fewer unique patterns than expected on the second far-transfer 
problem, which required generation of a novel rule. Common completion pattern use could be 
driven by knowledge of surface or structural relations for many of the other problems; however, 
as the second problem depended on discovery of a novel relation, knowledge of previous 
structural relations would not be much help unless that knowledge were highly abstracted. It is 
possible that participants in the practice condition acquired more proceduralized knowledge that 
caused them to use more of the same completion patterns even when those completion patterns 
were less efficient, such as on a far-transfer problem; however, if that is the case, it is surprising 
that the trend of the practice participants using more common patterns was not detected for any 
other problems 
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Analyses of achievement goals assessed at the task level suggested that learning 
condition affected participants’ endorsement of several achievement goals. Participants in the 
practice condition endorsed performance-approach goals more strongly than participants in the 
instructional explanation condition, suggesting that training focused on getting answers to 
problems promoted more of an emphasis of performing well relative to others than training 
focused on studying solution steps. Participants in the analogical comparison condition endorsed 
mastery-avoidance goals more strongly than participants in the practice condition, suggesting 
that training focused on comparing and abstracting across examples promotes more of an 
emphasis on avoiding a failure to deeply understand content compared to training focused on 
getting answers to problems. 
Finally, analyses on learning process endorsement suggested that participants in the 
practice condition were less likely to report comparing example problems to the content of the 
tutorial. This is not surprising, as all other instructional conditions called attention to the relation 
between tutorial information and the examples, either in the form of instructional explanations 
that made those connections for the participant or prompts that encouraged the participant to 
apply that knowledge. 
It is possible that participants were unsure of how to respond to the analogical 
comparison and self-explanation prompts, thus reducing distinctions between the types of 
knowledge representations supported by each process. Much prior work examining self-
explanation has employed more extensive training and modeling to increase the degree to which 
participants engage in productive self-explanation when prompted. Such training may increase 
the strength of the intervention and improve the likelihood of detecting differences if they exist. 
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 Finally, the design choice to use an artificial problem-solving domain presented both 
opportunities and challenges. Sequence extrapolation problems allowed tighter control over the 
relation between examples and test items, permitting carefully manipulation of the levels of 
transfer across problems. Using such a domain also likely reduced variability in prior knowledge, 
since there is relatively little relevant prior knowledge and this sort of problem is not typically 
discussed in school. However, there are several major shortcomings that may have made such 
problems ill-suited for examining the present research questions. First, the issue of there being 
little relevant prior knowledge could impede two hypothesized self-explanation mechanisms: the 
revision of errors and gaps in prior knowledge and the building of connections between prior 
knowledge and new information. Second, the types of principles most useful in learning to do 
sequence extrapolation problems may not have been well suited to the mechanisms targeted by 
self-explanation and analogical comparison. Both self-explanation and analogical comparison are 
instructional techniques thought to support the identification of abstract principles that apply to 
novel content; in a domain where few abstract principles exist, engaging in processes that aim to 
identify such principles might not be a particularly fruitful activity. Finally, sequence 
extrapolation problems are far removed from the type of academic content typically studied in 
the classroom, and thus any conclusions drawn from this work may have limited applicability to 
the way students learn academic content in the classroom through self-explanation or analogical 
comparison. Thus, while the domain choice was appropriate for fine-grained questions about 
knowledge representations and levels of transfer, it may not have been an ideal choice for 
addressing the primary question of how learning outcomes supported by self-explanation and 
analogical comparison might differ. I now describe a second experiment designed to extend these 
findings in a rich scientific domain. 
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6.0  EXPERIMENT 2: SELF-EXPLANATION AND ANALOGICAL COMPARISON 
OF SCIENCE MATERIALS 
Experiment 1 showed inconsistent results, with relatively few distinctions emerging between 
self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions. As discussed above, results may have 
reflected a number of particular details related to the experimental design and measures, 
including the lack of training in each technique and the choice of content domain. Alternatively, 
the absence of differences between self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions might 
indicate that both support the same types of knowledge and performance. To assess whether the 
lack of differences in results stemmed from poor training implementation and other experimental 
design shortcomings or a genuine lack of difference in knowledge supported by the two 
techniques, I conducted a second experiment. Experiment 2 aimed to apply and extend results to 
a conceptually rich content domain, which may provide a better reflection of the types of 
knowledge and learning processes activated by different instructional techniques. Specifically, I 
conducted an experiment in which learners studied text about electricity and electric circuits, and 
engaged in self-explanation, analogical comparison, or study of instructional explanations 
illustrating relevant concepts. For example, students likely have more prior knowledge regarding 
physics content compared to sequence extrapolation problems. Therefore the mechanisms of 
building connections to prior knowledge and identifying gaps or contradictions in one’s 
knowledge likely will be much more relevant.  
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While Experiment 1 assessed achievement goal and learning process self-reports, 
Experiment 2 aimed to improve understanding of those results by introducing more robust 
measures. A domain-framed achievement goal questionnaire was included in addition to the 
task-framed questionnaire to better identify the extent to which condition assignment changed 
participants’ goals relative to their general goals for the domain. The learning process items 
employed in Experiment 1 aimed to capture a wide range of learning and test strategies with just 
one item per construct. Experiment 2 employed a series of learning process questionnaires 
developed in other work (Zepeda & Nokes-Malach, 2015) as an alternative to protocol analysis 
for quantifying the degree to which different individuals engaged specifically in processes of 
self-explanation and analogical comparison. Most studies of self-explanation involve extensive 
analysis of learners’ written or verbal protocols, constraining the study of self-explanation to 
research environments or tasks developed for the purpose of collecting protocols. A 
questionnaire of self-explanation could be deployed more easily across a variety of academic 
settings and might improve understanding of why some students are more successful in acquiring 
concepts and revising misconceptions than others. Although analogical comparison research has 
employed protocol analysis less frequently, much prior work has assessed analogy use through 
observational data (e.g., Richland, Holyoak, & Stigler, 2004) and experimental manipulations 
(e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983). As with the study of self-explanation, developing unobtrusive 
measures of analogical comparison could also improve understanding of how frequently learners 
engage in analogical comparison, and it could help explain why some students learn and transfer 
deep concepts more successfully than others. No prior work that I know of has attempted to 
create a questionnaire assessing students’ use of self-explanation or analogical comparison. The 
questionnaire also targeted metacognitive processes of monitoring, control, and evaluation. The 
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processes of self-explanation in particular are closely related to certain metacognitive processes, 
but the relation has not been extensively examined in prior work. Including metacognitive 
questionnaire items will permit closer examination of whether instructions to self-explain lead to 
greater reports of metacognitive behaviors. 
Research investigating both analogical comparison and self-explanation has highlighted 
the importance of prior knowledge (Gadgil et al., 2012; Hausmann & VanLehn, 2007; Rittle-
Johnson, Star, & Durkin, 2009). In the case of analogical comparison, the amount of prior 
knowledge a learner possesses can determine what features should be highlighted through 
comparison to promote optimal learning (Rittle-Johnson et al., 2009), and in at least some cases a 
certain amount of relevant prior knowledge is necessary for conceptual learning from 
comparison (Star & Rittle-Johnson, 2009). In the case of self-explanation, two of the primary 
mechanisms through which it supports learning are filling gaps in prior knowledge and 
prompting the revision of inaccuracies in prior knowledge (Nokes et al., 2011). While prior 
knowledge supports learning in both cases, the mechanisms of self-explanation seem to depend 
more on activating and modifying prior knowledge relative to analogical comparison. 
Understanding the role and relative importance of prior knowledge for both instructional 
techniques could provide useful conditions for when learners are more likely to benefit from one 
instructional technique than the other. For this reason, I included a pretest measuring students’ 
prior knowledge in the domain of electricity and electric current, and I examined whether the 
relation between pretest and posttest scores differed across conditions, which might suggest that 
prior knowledge played a different role depending on the instructional condition. 
For both processes, the types of knowledge produced depend a great deal on the design of 
the materials, such as the amount of analogical comparison support provided (Gentner et al., 
  66 
2003) or whether self-explanation prompts focus on filling gaps in knowledge or revising mental 
models (Nokes et al., 2011). I therefore aimed to control factors such as the amount of 
scaffolding provided (introduction to the process, modeling, and prompting) and the target of the 
prompts to self-explain or compare (worked examples). Controlling for such factors could 
provide clearer evidence about the relative support each process provides for different learning 
outcomes. Aside from the change of content domain and addition of questionnaires, conditions 
and measures were designed to mirror those used in Experiment 1 as closely as possible.  I 
hypothesized that the type of instructional activity learners engaged in (self-explanation, 
analogical comparison, reading instructional explanations) would predict participants’ 
representations of knowledge, which in turn would predict the levels of transfer they 
demonstrated on a posttest. I also expected participants to report engaging in the activities 
prompted by their condition instructions more than participants in other conditions. Finally, I 
expected prompted instructional activities to change participants’ achievement goals as they 
related to the learning tasks and the degree to which they reported engaging in metacognitive 
behaviors. Detailed predictions are included in the methods. 
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7.0  METHOD 
7.1 PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and one college students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the 
University of Pittsburgh participated in the study. Participants received three credits toward a 
research participation requirement associated with the course. The majority of participants were 
in their first (n = 68) or second (n = 20) year of college, with only a few in their third (n = 7), 
fourth (n = 4), or fifth years (n = 2). Eighty-eight of 101 participants reported having taken a 
physics course either in high school or college. 
7.2 DESIGN 
The experiment had a between-subjects design and participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions: self-explanation, analogical comparison, or instructional explanations. 
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7.3 MATERIALS 
All participants completed the same basic learning materials, tests, and questionnaires. Each 
condition received a different introductory page of the learning materials that highlighted the 
benefits of analogical comparison, self-explanation, or instructional explanation study, and 
different instructions targeting a series of worked examples at the end of each learning booklet, 
which modeled and prompted either analogical comparison, self-explanation, or study of 
instructional explanations. I describe these differences in greater detail below. 
7.3.1 Learning materials 
Four booklets of instructional materials were adapted from a prior study by Richey and Nokes-
Malach (2013) and covered concepts related to electricity and electric circuits. Most college 
students have had prior exposure to these concepts yet still hold a number of misconceptions 
about the topic (Slotta & Chi, 2006). Thus, the topic was well suited for examining types of 
transfer and included features, principles and relations that could be identified through analogical 
comparison or self-explanation. The topic was also appropriate for measuring near transfer, 
intermediate transfer, far transfer, and PFL transfer.  
All booklets were printed on paper, and participants were encouraged to mark up the 
booklets or make notes. Each booklet contained several pages of instructional text followed by 
worked examples and practice problems related to the preceding text. Specifically, the first 
booklet contained two pages of instructional text, two worked examples, and one practice 
problem. The second booklet contained two pages of instructional text, four worked examples, 
and two practice problems. The third booklet contained three pages of instructional text, two 
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worked examples, and one practice problem. The fourth booklet contained two pages of 
instructional text, six worked examples, and two practice problems. 
Booklets differed across conditions in the introductory instructions participants received 
and the prompts included before each worked example at the end of each booklet (Appendix A). 
Conditions were reinforced with a brief description of the utility of the targeted process at the 
beginning of the first booklet and an example response to the prompts after the first worked 
example. After the first worked example prompt in the first booklet, the self-explanation 
condition received written modeled explanations illustrating monitoring, bridging, and 
elaborating statements about the worked example. Modeling self-explanation has been shown to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of responses (McNamara, 2004). After studying the 
modeled responses, participants in the self-explanation condition were prompted after the next 
worked example to write their own monitoring, bridging, and elaborating statements. The 
analogical comparison condition received written modeled comparison statements identifying 
similarities across the first two worked examples and discussing the conceptual significance of 
those similarities. After studying the modeled response, participants were prompted to elaborate 
by identifying additional similarities. The instructional explanation condition saw the same 
prompt included before every example in that condition with no additional modeling, as the 
prompts did not require a written response. 
Worked examples were created in pairs with surface dissimilarities (e.g., different values, 
cover stories) and either the same or contrasting relations. Each pair of worked examples also 
had a corresponding practice problem with surface dissimilarities but the same relations. Worked 
example pairs were presented side-by-side on the same page in the analogical comparison 
condition. To suppress spontaneous comparison, they were presented on sequential pages in the 
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self-explanation and instructional explanation conditions. Instructional explanations focused on 
concepts related to each example step and were similar to elaborative explanations participants in 
the self-explanation condition were expected to generate on their own (Schworm & Renkl, 
2006). They were included to suppress spontaneous self-explanation in the instructional 
explanation condition and control the amount of information reviewed across conditions while 
manipulating the processes (reading, self-explaining, comparing). Figure 11 shows a worked 
example from the instructional explanations condition; the self-explanation and analogical 
comparison conditions saw the same example with the step-by-step solution (right column) but 
without the instructional explanations (left column). The analogical comparison condition saw 
the example side-by-side with the next example, which asked the same question and included a 
diagram of a series circuit with two 3-ohm light bulbs.  
7.3.2 Test materials 
A five-item pretest and 36-item posttest were administered to measure participants’ learning. The 
posttest consisted of both multiple-choice and short-answer questions and contained 13 near-
transfer items (α = .33), 17 intermediate-transfer items (α = .61), 12 far-transfer items (α = .44), 
and nine preparation for future learning (PFL) transfer items (α = .53). Items were coded for 
transfer level based on the definitions of transfer based on Barnett and Ceci's (2002) and Nokes-
Malach et al.'s (2013) models of transfer and their relationship to the materials in the 
instructional text and worked examples. For example, the worked example in Figure 11 
corresponded to several test problems, including a near-transfer question asking about current in 
a two-branch parallel circuit with new values for resistance (identical problem-solving 
procedure); an intermediate-transfer question asking about resistance in a three-branch parallel 
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circuit (problem-solving procedure requires abstraction to be applied to circuit with a different 
number of branches and to solve for a different variable); and a far-transfer question asking how 
total current changes in a parallel circuit when additional branches are added (problem-solving 
procedure requires inference and reasoning to determine abstract relationship between number of 
branches and total current). An additional learning resource about power was embedded in the 
test and provided information for answering the PFL transfer items, which targeted how well 
participants were prepared to learn from a new instructional resource about a related topic 
(Bransford & Schwartz, 1999).  
 
Figure 11. Worked example with instructional explanations. 
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Two independent coders coded all short-answer items using a rubric, discussed any 
differences, and reached 100 percent agreement for all items. Instructions to self-explain or 
compare worked examples were expected to support greater intermediate, far, and PFL transfer 
than studying worked examples with instructional explanations, as both self-explanation and 
analogical comparison support the identification of deep, conceptual features and generation of 
abstract principles that more easily transfer to new situations. Analogical comparison may reduce 
learning of the concrete procedures that support problem-solving performance. 
7.3.3 Questionnaires 
A series of questionnaires assessed participants’ self-reported use of the learning processes 
targeted in this experiment, their metacognitive behaviors, and their achievement goals as they 
relate to science in general and the particular learning tasks completed in this experiment.  
7.3.3.1 Open-ended learning processes question 
Participants responded to a question asking them to describe in as much detail as possible the 
learning processes they used while studying the learning materials. Participants’ responses, 
which were generally several sentences long, were used to capture the degree to which learners 
described engaging in behaviors consistent with self-explanation, analogical comparison, and 
studying instructional explanations. It was also included to capture additional strategies or 
behaviors that might provide a more detailed picture of individual differences in learning 
behaviors and unexpected behaviors (i.e., those not intentionally encouraged through the learning 
prompts) that might nevertheless lead to greater learning. While participants’ descriptions of 
their learning processes were expected to show some consistencies with their condition 
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assignments (e.g., participants assigned to the self-explanation condition were expected to use 
more language related to the processes associated with self-explanation), some individuals might 
also discuss other processes associated with better learning outcomes. 
7.3.3.2 Learning processes questionnaire 
Zepeda and Nokes-Malach (2015) created the learning-processes questionnaires by identifying 
critical features of self-explanation and analogical comparison. Ten items examined students’ use 
of self-explanation, e.g., “During the activity, as I solved a problem I would explain to myself 
what concepts were being applied and why” (α = .83), and 11 items examined analogical 
comparison, e.g., “During the activity, I often compared and contrasted one part to a previous 
part of the text or problem” (α = .90). All items were framed at the task level, and participants 
rated how much they agreed or disagreed with each item on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). I expected instructions to self-explain or compare 
worked examples during the learning phase to lead to greater self-reports of engaging in self-
explanation and analogical comparison, respectively. Additionally, I predicted that self-reports of 
engaging in self-explanation or analogical comparison will predict test performance above and 
beyond the differences explained by condition assignment, with analogical comparison leading 
to worse performance on near-transfer questions and both analogical comparison and self-
explanation supporting better performance on intermediate-, far-, and PFL-transfer items. 
7.3.3.3 Metacognitive questionnaire 
Zepeda and Nokes-Malach (2015) selected items for the metacognitive questionnaire from a 
number of existing measures of metacognitive behaviors; the questionnaire was designed to 
target three components of metacognition: monitoring, e.g., “During the activity, I tried to 
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determine which concepts I didn't understand well” (α = .87), control, e.g. “During the activity, I 
changed strategies when I failed to understand the problem” (α = .79), and evaluation, e.g., 
“During the activity, I reviewed what I had learned” (α = .82). All items were framed at the task 
level, and participants rated how much they agreed or disagreed with each item on a 7-point 
Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
7.3.3.4 Achievement goals questionnaires 
Elliot and colleagues’ Achievement Goals Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R; Elliot & Murayama, 
2008) was used to assess participants’ self-reported, domain-level achievement goals framed 
around science class. The questionnaire assessed participants’ endorsement of mastery-approach 
(α = .91), mastery-avoidance (α = .76), performance-approach (α = .89), and performance-
avoidance goals (α = .93). Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
A second questionnaire was modified slightly to assess participants’ self-reported goals at 
the task level. Specifically, the instructions asked participants to consider their feelings about the 
activities they completed during the learning phase. The questionnaire assessed participants’’ 
self-reported endorsement of task-level mastery-approach (α = .80), mastery-avoidance (α = 
.58), performance-approach (α = .94), and performance-avoidance goals (α = .91). Responses 
were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
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7.4 PROCEDURE 
Participants completed the experiment individually in sessions of three to five students at a time; 
they were not permitted to talk to each other during the experiment. Following completion of a 
brief pretest, participants began working individually through the self-paced learning booklets. 
Participants were notified of a time limit for each booklet of the learning materials (15 minutes 
for the first, 20 for the second, 25 for the third, and 30 for the fourth) and booklets were 
distributed one at a time. While participants could flip back or ahead within each booklet, they 
could not go back to a previous booklet and could not move ahead until everyone in the room 
had finished the current materials. Participants could not move on to the next booklet until 
everyone in a session had completed the prior booklet. Upon completing the learning booklets, 
participants responded to the learning processes questionnaires, as well as a metacognition 
questionnaire and task-framed achievement goals questionnaire. Participants then were given 55 
minutes to complete the posttest, followed by the domain-framed achievement goals 
questionnaire. Most sessions used the majority of the time allotted, and there were no effects of 
condition on learning time, F(2, 98) = 1.40, p = .25, ηp2 = .028, or test time, F(2, 98) = .25, p = 
.78, ηp2 = .005. 
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8.0  RESULTS 
Analyses focused on testing the effect of learning condition on performance at each level of 
transfer assessed by the posttest as well as responses on the learning processes and achievement 
goal questionnaires. I also examined the relations between participants’ self-reported learning 
processes and posttest performance. Posttest performance is reported as a proportional accuracy 
representing the number of correct items out of the total number of items for each level of 
transfer.  
8.1.1 Assessment of learning quality 
To better understand what cognitive processes were triggered by the learning packet prompts, I 
coded responses for all participants in the self-explanation and analogical comparison conditions. 
In the self-explanation condition, responses were coded on a scale of zero to four, ranging from 
no response at all, to a response that merely paraphrased content already provided in the 
example, to a response that went beyond what the example stated (e.g., through connections to 
other content in the instructional packets, references to prior knowledge or experiences, 
statements monitoring understanding). This coding is consistent with how Hausmann and 
VanLehn (2010) differentiated between paraphrasing and self-explaining. Table 5 includes self-
  77 
explanation responses that received a range of scores targeting the worked example shown in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Worked example that served as the target of prompt responses included in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  
Rubric parameters and examples of prompt responses directed at the worked example shown in 
Figure 12 for scores 1-4. 
Scale Rubric Participant example 
1 Wrote very short notes about content of 
WE – maybe naming principle or 
describing briefly 
Pair 1 is the same charge +. Close together so 
greater PE. 
 
2 Wrote more but exclusively about 
content of WE, maybe put WE content 
together in different way; no mention of 
ideas from instructional materials, prior 
knowledge, monitoring, etc OR 
mentioned other ideas but in superficial 
way with no new insights. 
Electrical potential energy depends on charge 
and distance. Similar charge will repel; pair 
one will repel but have higher electrical 
potential energy because they repel but are 
close to one another. 
3 Wrote primarily about ideas presented The figure titled “Electrical Potential Energy 
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directly in WE, with minor mention of 
ideas either from instructional 
materials, prior knowledge, info about 
understanding. New inferences or 
insights clearly present. 
and Reliable Position” shows that like 
charged particles have more potential energy 
when they are closer together. Thus, Pair 1 
has a greater electrical potential energy 
between them. 
 
4 Wrote primarily about ideas not 
presented directly in WE (e.g., from 
instructional text, prior knowledge, 
metacognitive reflections). New 
inferences or insights clearly present. 
Pair 1 – Repulsion: 2 of the same charge. Less 
distance between particles  more work 
required to keep particles in position (gets 
more of electric field)  greater electric 
potential energy. Pair 2 – Repulsion: 2 of the 
same charge. More distance between particles 
 Less work required to keep particles in 
position (gets less of electric field)  less 
electric potential energy 
 
The example receiving a score of one briefly restates details from the worked example 
(that both charges are positive, that Pair 1 has greater electrical potential energy), while the 
example receiving a score of two more elaborately summarizes the points in the worked example 
(that charge and distance are both factors determining electrical potential energy). These are 
important details, but they are specific to the worked example and do not generalize toward any 
principles relating electrical charge, distance, or potential energy, nor do they relate the details in 
the examples to participants’ prior knowledge or beliefs about the topic. Since the responses do 
not demonstrate any of the mechanisms hypothesized to support learning and knowledge revision 
through self-explanation, I would not expect participants generating these types of response to 
experience any learning advantages as a result of receiving self-explanation prompts; moreover, 
participants producing such responses would likely learn less than those who received more 
detailed instructional explanations, which lack a constructive element but highlight more general 
principles.  
The example receiving a score of three makes a generalization (“like charged particles 
have more potential energy when they are closer together”), though this generalization is not a 
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principle that could be applied to other types of charges. The example receiving a score of four 
identifies a more general principle (the pair that requires more work to keep the charges in 
position has greater electrical potential energy) that could be applied to any two pairs of charges 
to determine their relative electrical potential energy. Both examples demonstrate some of the 
generalization process thought to support greater learning through self-explanation, so I would 
expect participants’ generating such responses to demonstrate greater learning relative to 
participants in the same condition receiving lower scores as well as participants in the 
instructional explanations condition, which received but did not generate principles. The process 
of abstracting generalized information from the worked examples and the generalized 
information itself should support test performance. 
For participants in the analogical comparison condition, I coded responses on a scale of 
zero to four, ranging from no response, to listing a similarity or comparison with no elaboration 
on its significance, to listing similarities and differences with discussion of why those similarities 
or differences were meaningful. Table 6 includes analogical comparison responses that received 
a range of scores targeting the worked example shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Worked example that served as the target of prompt responses included in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  
Rubric parameters and examples of prompt responses directed at the worked example shown in 
Figure 13 for scores 1-4. 
1 Identified one similarity 
OR difference without 
explaining or discussing 
meaning 
One pair repels each other, the other pair attracts 
2 Identified one similarity 
AND one difference 
without explaining or 
discussing meaning 
Both problems give 2 different pairs of charges and ask which 
one has the greater electrical potential energy. In both examples, 
similar steps are taken and very similar qualities of charges and 
electrical forces are identified. However, the final answers are 
different because different pairs in each example are used. 
3 Identified one similarity 
OR one difference and 
elaborated on its 
significance, meaning, etc 
The first problem deals with like charges while the second deals 
with unlike charges. If the charge is the same, less distance 
means higher potential energy. If the charges are different, less 
distance means less potential energy. 
4 Identified one similarity 
AND one difference and 
elaborated on their 
significance, meaning, etc. 
Similar – In both problems all objects are charged and have 
electrical fields. They all exert forces on each other. 
Different – In 1 they are like charges so they repel each other 
meaning 1 has more PE. In 2 they are different charges so they 
attract meaning 2 has more PE. 
Concept – PE relies on both distance and charge. In like charges 
the distance is small for high PE in different charges distance is 
large for high PE. 
 
The example receiving a one states a difference between the two examples, but it does 
not identify why this difference is relevant to the determination of electrical potential energy. 
The example receiving a two states a number of similarities and differences between the steps 
but again fails to relate those similarities and differences to an underlying principle. Analogical 
comparison is hypothesized to promote learning through the recognition of key principles 
highlighted through similarities or differences between examples; thus, participants producing 
these types of responses are not expected to demonstrate any learning advantages as a result of 
receiving analogical comparison prompts. Further, because participants in the instructional 
explanation condition received principles accompanying each example, they would be expected 
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to perform better on the posttest than participants receiving mostly ones or twos on their prompt 
responses. 
The example receiving a three identifies a key difference relating types of charge, 
distance, and electrical potential energy. This difference suggests a principle that could be 
applied to new cases and goes beyond what is stated in the worked examples. The example 
receiving a four identifies the same principle relating types of charge, distance, and electrical 
potential energy, but it also identifies key similarities across the examples. Both of these 
responses identify deep principles through the act of comparing examples, one of the underlying 
mechanisms thought to promote learning through analogical comparison. Consequently, 
participants who create such responses are more likely to exhibit the learning benefits expected 
from engaging in analogical comparison and should perform better on the posttest than those 
receiving instructional explanations. 
To examine the effect of quantity and quality separately in analyzing prompt responses, I 
also coded the number of words participants wrote on each worked example page. Table 7 shows 
correlations between posttest performance (total accuracy and by transfer level), average prompt 
response score, and average word count per prompt. Correlations were run separately for each 
condition, as the content of the prompts differed across conditions. For the self-explanation 
condition, quality of prompt response was significantly, positively correlated with near-transfer 
performance and marginally correlated with total test performance. Number of words written 
was marginally, negatively correlated with intermediate-transfer and total posttest performance. 
No other correlations were significant for either condition.  
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Table 7.  
Correlation (r) between prompt response scores, average word count, and test performance by 
condition. 
 Word 
count 
Posttest Near Intermediate Far PFL M SD 
Self-
explanation 
        
Prompt score -.10 .31† .38* .015 .24 .22 1.74 1.30 
Word count ― -.34† -.26 -.32† -.099 -.20 29.38 13.61 
Analogical 
comparison 
        
Prompt score -.002 .16 .081 .23 .047 .039 1.66 1.32 
Word count ― .15 .17 .014 .17 .14 38.83 15.86 
 
8.1.2 Condition effects on learning 
I conducted a series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to assess the effect of condition 
on the pretest and posttest. Pretest performance was calculated as an accuracy score out of one 
by dividing the number of correct pretest items by the total number of items. Learning packet 
performance was calculated as the total number of points awarded for correct answers to learning 
packet problems; each problem was worth 1 point except the problem in the third packet, which 
had two possible answers and thus participants could receive a total of 2 points if they wrote both 
correct answers. No condition effects were found for pretest, F(2, 98) = .64, p = .53, np2 = .013,  
or learning packet accuracy, F(2, 98) = 0.078, p = .93, np2 = .002, and thus neither measure was 
used as a covariate in posttest analyses. Descriptives for both are included in Table 8.  
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Table 8.  
 
Mean and standard deviation of pretest and learning packet accuracy by condition. 
 
 Pretest Learning packets  
 N M SD N M SD 
Self-
explanation 
34 .49 .23 34 5.96 .84 
Analogical 
comparison 
34 .42 .21 34 5.94 .72 
Instructional 
explanation 
33 .46 .27 33 5.88 1.06 
Total 101 .46 .24 101 5.93 .88 
 
Participants received a point for each posttest item answered correctly; for quantitative 
questions, they received a point for the numerical value and a point for the units. Accuracy was 
calculated as the total number of points a participant received divided by the total number of 
points possible, which was 51. Accuracy was also calculated separately for near-transfer, 
intermediate-transfer, far-transfer, and PFL-transfer items. A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
medium effect of condition on total posttest accuracy, F(2, 98) = 3.22, p = .044, np2 = .062 
(Figure 10). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
the instructional explanation condition (M = .63, SD = .10) was significantly different from the 
analogical comparison condition (M = .56, SD = .12), p = .034, ηp2 = .062. However, the self-
explanation condition (M = .59, SD = .094) did not significantly differ from the instructional 
explanation (p = .39) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .43).  
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Figure 14. Posttest accuracy on subsets of items classified by transfer distance. 
Looking at subsections of the posttest based on transfer level, there was a marginal effect 
of condition on near-transfer accuracy, F(2, 98) = 2.91, p = .059, ηp2 = .056. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the instructional 
explanation condition (M = .75, SD = .12) was marginally different from the self-explanation 
condition (M = .68, SD = .14), p = .051. However, the analogical comparison condition (M = .70, 
SD = .12) did not significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = .26) or self-
explanation conditions (p = .70).  
There was also marginal effect of condition on intermediate-transfer accuracy, F(2, 98) = 
2.89, p = .060, ηp2 = .056. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean score for the analogical comparison condition (M = .60, SD = .16) was marginally different 
from the self-explanation condition (M = .68, SD = .12), p = .081. However, the instructional 
explanation condition (M = .67, SD = .15) did not significantly differ from the self-explanation 
(p = .98) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .12). There was no effect of condition on far-
transfer accuracy, F(2, 98) = 0.83, p = .44, ηp2 = .017.  
There was a medium effect of condition on PFL performance, F(2, 98) = 3.34, p = .039, 
ηp2 = .064. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the 
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instructional explanation condition (M = .69, SD = .20) was significantly different from the 
analogical comparison condition (M = .57, SD = .22), p = .040. However, the self-explanation 
condition (M = .66, SD = .18) did not significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = 
.81) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .15). 
8.1.3 Open-ended learning processes question 
Participants’ open-ended learning processes descriptions were analyzed using Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007) dictionaries created to assess 
word-use related to cognitive processes (analogical comparison, self-explanation, and worked-
example study), metacognitive processes (monitoring, control, and evaluation), and achievement 
goals (mastery goals, performance goals, approach goals, and avoidance goals). Dictionaries for 
each construct were created based on the critical features and mechanisms of each process or 
goal dimension and are included in Appendix B. 
For cognitive processes, there was a trend such that each condition reported more use of 
the process associated with their condition. A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
assess effects of condition on word use across the different dictionaries (Figure 11). There was a 
significant effect on example word use, F(2, 98) = 3.44, p = .036, ηp2 = .066, and post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the instructional 
explanation condition (M = 5.80, SD = .59) was different from the self-explanation condition (M 
= 3.63, SD = .58), p = .027. However, the analogical comparison condition (M = 4.57, SD = .58) 
did not significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = .30) or self-explanation 
conditions (p = .49). There was also a marginal effect on explanation word use, F(2, 98) = 2.40, 
p = .096, ηp2 = .047, and post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
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score for the self-explanation condition (M = .83, SD = .17) was marginally different from the 
instructional explanation condition (M = .31, SD = .18), p = .081. However, the analogical 
comparison condition (M = .44, SD = .17) did not significantly differ from the self-explanation 
(p = .26) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .85). There was no effect on comparison word 
use, F(2, 98) = 1.95, p = .15, ηp2 = .038. 
For metacognitive process words, there was a medium effect of condition on use of 
monitoring words, F(2, 98) = 4.59, p = .012, ηp2 = .086, and post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the self-explanation condition (M = 2.27, SD = 
.30) was different from the instructional explanation condition (M = .97, SD = .31), p = .009. 
However, the analogical comparison condition (M = 1.53, SD = .30) did not significantly differ 
from the self-explanation (p = .20) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .40). There was also 
a medium effect of condition on evaluation words, F(2, 98) = 5.62, p = .005, ηp2 = .10, and post 
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the analogical 
comparison condition (M = .79, SD = .32) was different from the instructional explanation 
condition (M = 2.30, SD = .32), p = .003. However, the self-explanation condition (M = 1.39, SD 
= .32) did not significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = .11) or analogical 
comparison conditions (p = .39). There was no effect of condition on control words, F(2, 98) = 
.235, p = .79, ηp2 = .005. 
For goal words, there were no significant effects of condition on the use of mastery, F(2, 
98) = .67, p = .52, ηp2 = .013, performance, F(2, 98) = .25, p = .78, ηp2 = .005, or approach 
words, F(2, 98) = 1.82, p = .17, ηp2 = .036. No use of avoidance words was found for any 
participant. 
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Figure 15. Use of cognitive and metacognitive processes and goal language. 
Next, I examined correlations between word use in participants’ open-ended learning 
process responses and their posttest performance (Table 9). Relatively few cognitive, 
metacognitive, or goal words were associated with any measure of posttest performance, and no 
consistent patterns emerged. There were marginal, positive correlations between comparison 
word use and far transfer, example word use and total accuracy, evaluation word use and 
intermediate transfer, and mastery goal word use and near transfer. These results are consistent 
with general predictions that engaging in explanation, comparison, and evaluation would 
promote learning and test performance, as would mastery goals. There was also a significant, 
negative correlation between control word use and intermediate transfer, and a marginal, 
negative correlation between approach goal word use and near transfer.  
 
Table 9.  
Correlations between cognitive, metacognitive, and goal word use and posttest performance. 
 Total 
accuracy 
Near 
transfer 
Intermediate 
transfer 
Far 
transfer 
PFL 
transfer 
Comparison .16 .042 .10 .17† .13 
Explanation .14 .073 .16 -.026 .15 
Examples .19† .082 .14 .13 .15 
Monitoring .016 -.11 .12 -.038 .027 
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Control -.091 -.022 -.21* .024 .019 
Evaluation .073 .022 .17† -.088 .057 
Mastery -.013 .19† -.14 .044 -.070 
Performance .12 .038 .12 .09 .075 
Approach -.084 -.17† -.010 -.080 -.002 
8.1.4 Learning processes questionnaire 
Participants’ responses to each survey item were averaged within each construct to create scores 
for cognitive (explanation and comparison), metacognitive (monitoring, control, and evaluation), 
and motivation variables (mastery approach, mastery avoidance, performance approach, and 
performance avoidance). I examined condition effects on survey responses for each construct, 
the relation between survey responses and posttest performance, and the correlation between 
survey responses and words used in the open-ended learning processes descriptions. 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a medium effect of condition on reported use of 
metacognitive processes, F(2, 98) = 5.20, p = .007, ηp2 = .096 (Figure 12). Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the instructional explanation 
condition (M = 5.22, SD = .96) was significantly different from the self-explanation condition (M 
= 4.51, SD = .92). However, the analogical comparison condition (M = 4.80, SD = .83) did not 
significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = .14) or self-explanation conditions (p 
= .40). There was no effect of condition on self-reported use of comparison, F(2, 98) = .40, p = 
.67, ηp2 = .008, or explanation, F(2, 98) = 1.14, p = .33, ηp2 = .023. 
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Figure 16. Endorsement of cognitive and metacognitive processes by condition. 
To test the amount of variance in posttest performance explained by self-reported self-
explanation, analogical comparison, and metacognition, variance due to the condition assignment 
was removed using hierarchical multiple regression. Condition was dummy-coded with the 
instructional explanation condition as the reference group. Self-reported levels of self-
explanation, analogical comparison, and metacognition, were entered in a step-wise fashion into 
the second model with the first model containing the condition assignment variables. Table 10 
reports the adjusted R2 statistic of each model, the predictive value of each self-reported learning 
process independent of the condition assignment, and the effect of analogical-comparison and 
self-explanation condition assignment relative to instructional explanation condition assignment, 
controlling for self-reported processing. The models predicting overall, near-transfer, 
intermediate-transfer, and PFL-transfer posttest performance were significant, and within those 
models self-reported self-explanation was positively predictive of performance while analogical 
comparison was negatively predictive, controlling for condition. Self-reported metacognition 
was not predictive of performance in any model. 
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Table 10.  
Summary of multiple regression analyses for self-reported learning process use predicting 
subsets of the posttest. 
Test Adjusted 
R2 
F Use of 
explanation 
Use of 
comparison 
Use of 
metacognition 
Self-
explanation 
condition 
Analogical 
comparison 
condition 
Total .21 6.26* .49* -.31* -.070 -.080 -.27* 
Near .15 4.41* .36* -.31* -.005 -0.20† -.16 
Intermediate  .15 4.46* .46* -.19† -.11 .066 -.21† 
Far .019 1.37 .21 -.12 .067 -.084 -.067 
PFL .091 3.00* .28† -.24* -.12 -.056 -.29* 
*p < .05, † p < .10 
Finally, I examined the relationship between participants’ word use on the open-ended 
questionnaire and their self-reported ratings on the strategies questionnaire (Table 11). Contrary 
to predictions, there were no correlations between word use for a particular strategy and 
endorsement of the strategy on the questionnaire. There was a significant, positive correlation 
between performance goal word use and self-reported monitoring behaviors, as well as a 
significant, negative correlation between approach goal word use and self-reported evaluation 
behaviors. 
 
Table 11.  
Correlations between cognitive, metacognitive, and goal word use and self-reported responses 
on the strategies questionnaire. 
 Survey 
AC 
Survey 
SE 
Survey MC	   Survey	  MC	  
–	  Monitor	  
Survey	  MC	  
-­‐	  Control	  
MC - 
Evaluation 
Comparison .020 .045 .041	   .078	   .013	   -.005 
Explanation -.087 .044 -.048	   -­‐.068	   -­‐.022	   -.019 
Examples .12 .080 .10	   .096	   .046	   .11 
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Monitoring .056 .030 -.081	   -­‐.057	   -­‐.11	   -.071 
Control -.16 -.013 -.11	   -­‐.065	   -­‐.099	   -.15 
Evaluation .069 -.032 -.038	   -­‐.064	   -­‐.075	   .032 
Mastery .079 -.053 -.016	   -­‐.068	   .013	   .043 
Performance .13 .14 .18†	   .21*	   .087	   .14 
Approach .081 -.088 -.14	   -­‐.083	   -­‐.097	   -.20* 
 
8.1.5 Task-framed achievement goal surveys 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of condition on task-framed mastery-approach 
goal endorsement, F(2, 98) = 2.86, p = .062, ηp2 = .055 (Figure 13). Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the self-explanation condition (M = 5.46, 
SD = 1.17) was marginally different from the instructional explanation condition (M = 6.01, SD 
= .87; p = .096). However, the analogical comparison condition (M = 5.47, SD = 1.15) did not 
significantly differ from the instructional explanation (p = .10) or self-explanation conditions (p 
> .99). There was no effect of condition on endorsement of task-framed mastery-avoidance, F(2, 
98) = .025, p = .98, ηp2 = .001, performance-approach, F(2, 98) =2.14, p = .12, ηp2 = .042, or 
performance-avoidance goals, F(2, 98) = 1.23, p = .30, ηp2 = .024. 
 
Figure 17. Endorsement of task-framed achievement goals by condition. 
1	  2	  
3	  4	  
5	  6	  
7	  
Task	  mastery	  approach	   Task	  mastery	  avoidance	   Task	  performance	  approach	   Task	  performance	  avoidance	  
Ra
ti
ng
	  
Self-­‐explanation	  Analogical	  comparison	  Instructional	  explanation	  
  92 
To test the amount of variance in posttest performance explained by task-framed 
achievement goals, variance due to the condition assignment was removed using hierarchical 
multiple regression. Condition was dummy-coded with the instructional explanation condition as 
the reference group. Self-reported levels of task-framed mastery approach, mastery avoidance, 
performance approach, and performance avoidance were entered in a step-wise fashion into the 
second model with the first model containing the condition assignment variables. Table 12 
reports the adjusted R2 statistic of each model, the predictive value of each task-framed goal 
independent of the condition assignment, and the effect of analogical-comparison and self-
explanation condition assignment relative to instructional explanation condition assignment, 
controlling for task-framed goals. The models predicting overall, intermediate-transfer, and PFL-
transfer posttest performance were significant, and within those models task-framed mastery 
avoidance was positively predictive of performance while performance approach was sometimes 
marginally predictive, controlling for condition. 
 
Table 12.  
Summary of multiple regression analyses for task-framed achievement goals predicting subsets 
of the posttest. 
Test Adjusted 
R2 
F Mastery 
approach 
Mastery 
avoidance 
Performance 
approach 
Performance 
avoidance 
Self-
explanation 
condition 
Analogical 
comparison 
condition 
Total .14 3.61* .11 .23* .32† -.26 -.067 -.24* 
Near .036 1.62 .17 -.082 .18 -.15 -.20 -.12 
Inter.  .14 3.60* .052 .32* .21 -.19 .071 -.20† 
Far .017 1.28 .24† -.001 .17 -.23 -.060 -.013 
PFL .13 3.42* -.15 .32* .30† -.15 -.051 -.32* 
Misc. -.030 .52 -.19 .17 .059 .012 -.016 -.088 
*p < .05, † p < .10 
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8.1.6 Science class-framed surveys 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of condition on science class-framed mastery-
approach goal endorsement, F(2, 98) = 2.75, p = .069. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey 
HSD test indicated that the mean score for the instructional explanation condition (M = 6.10, SD 
= 1.10) was marginally different from the analogical comparison condition (M = 5.49, SD = 1.29; 
p = .061). However, the self-explanation condition (M = 5.90, SD = .84) did not significantly 
differ from the instructional explanation (p = .74) or analogical comparison conditions (p = .27). 
There was no effect of condition on endorsement of task-framed mastery-avoidance, F(2, 98) = 
.14, p = .87, performance-approach, F(2, 98) = .24, p = .79, or performance-avoidance goals, 
F(2, 98) = 1.99, p = .14 (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 18. Endorsement of science class-framed achievement goals by condition. 
To test the amount of variance in posttest performance explained by science class-framed 
achievement goals, variance due to the condition assignment was removed using hierarchical 
multiple regression. Condition was dummy-coded with the instructional explanation condition as 
the reference group. Self-reported levels of science class-framed mastery approach, mastery 
avoidance, performance approach, and performance avoidance were entered in a step-wise 
fashion into the second model with the first model containing the condition assignment variables. 
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Table 13 reports the adjusted R2 and F statistics for each model, the predictive value of each 
science class-framed goal independent of the condition assignment, and the effect of analogical-
comparison and self-explanation condition assignment relative to instructional explanation 
condition assignment, controlling for task-framed goals. The models predicting overall and PFL-
transfer posttest performance were significant, and within the model predicting PFL transfer, 
science class-framed performance approach was marginally predictive of performance. No other 
science class-framed achievement goals predicted performance on any posttest measure. 
 
Table 13.  
Summary of multiple regression analyses for science class-framed achievement goals predicting 
subsets of the posttest. 
Test Adjusted 
R2 
F Mastery 
approach 
Mastery 
avoidance 
Performance 
approach 
Performance 
avoidance 
Self-
explanation 
condition 
Analogical 
comparison 
condition 
Total .060 2.06† .080 .15 .14 -.096 -.12 -.25* 
Near .005 1.08 .078 -.036 .064 -.046 0.27* -.16 
Inter.  .044 2.89† .15 .12 -.001 -.008 .040 -.18 
Far .007 1.11 .078 .16 .12 -.22 -.12 -.030 
PFL .094 2.73* -.12 .15 .24† -.007 -.075 -.32* 
Misc. -.021 .66 -.18 .17 .095 -.053 .015 -.069 
*p < .05, † p < .10 
  95 
9.0  DISCUSSION 
In summary, results showed that instructing students to study worked examples with 
instructional explanations led to greater posttest performance compared to instructions to 
compare worked examples. There was no significant relation between learning condition and 
self-reported levels of self-explanation and analogical comparison, although instructional 
explanations led to greater self-reported levels of metacognition compared to self-explanation. 
Finally, participants’ self-reports of analogical comparison were significant, negative predictors 
of performance on near transfer and PFL transfer posttest items and a marginal, negative 
predictor of performance on intermediate transfer items. Self-reports of self-explanation were 
significant, positive predictors of near and intermediate transfer performance and a marginal, 
positive predictor of PFL transfer performance. 
One major factor to consider in assessing these results is the average quality of responses 
according to the prompt response coding. The quality of both the self-explanation and analogical 
comparison prompt responses averaged below a two on a four-point scale, indicating that they 
typically fell short of ideal responses that would be likely to entail the types of constructive 
processes hypothesized to support learning. This illustrates several important points. First, even 
when the participant sample is undergraduate students who have received instructional text, 
examples of self-explanations or comparisons, and prompts, they are not especially good at 
generating meaningful analogical comparison or self-explanation statements. Given this 
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evidence, future work may need to emphasize a more robust training so that participants are 
better equipped to produce fruitful self-explanations and analogical comparison. Incorporating 
more scaffolded prompts and immediate feedback on the quality of explanations or comparisons 
learners produce might improve the effectiveness of the interventions.  
Second, these results suggest the need to use caution when interpreting these results. The 
lack of difference between self-explanation and analogical comparison support conditions could 
suggest a genuine lack of differences in the knowledge outcomes facilitated by each process. 
This would be consistent with predictions made by with Chi’s active-constructive-interactive 
framework (Chi, 2009), which suggests that two cognitive processes that fall into the same 
category should produce similar knowledge outcomes. In this case, both analogical comparison 
and self-explanation are constructive processes, and thus there should be no major differences in 
the knowledge outcomes each produces. However, the results show that participants did not 
generally engage in the types of analogical comparison or self-explanation processes that prior 
research suggests are most likely to lead to deep learning. Therefore, any conclusions about a 
true lack of differences in knowledge outcomes would be better supported if a follow-up study 
that successfully triggered more fruitful self-explanation and analogical comparison also failed to 
show differences. Furthermore, Chi's (2009) framework would predict that as constructive 
activities, both self-explanation and analogical comparison would produce greater learning than 
an active instructional technique like reading instructional explanations. Results indicated that 
instructional explanations were more effective than either of the constructive processes, 
suggesting that truly constructive processes did not take place in the self-explanation and 
analogical comparison conditions.  
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These results raise several important questions. First, why was there no relation between 
condition and self-reported levels of self-explanation and analogical comparison? Prior work has 
shown that self-explanation and analogical comparison are effortful and subject to a great deal of 
individual variation, even when explicit instructions are given to engage in these processes (e.g., 
Chi et al., 1994; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Therefore, it is possible that condition assignment 
played a smaller role in determining the degree to which individuals engaged in different 
processes, compared to their spontaneous learning process tendencies. This is supported by 
evidence showing that self-reported use of analogical comparison and self-explanation predicted 
performance, suggesting these measures were meaningful. However, the lack of any relation 
between condition assignment and self-reported explanation and comparison behaviors suggests 
that some items on the questionnaire may have been misaligned to the task, or that participants 
had difficulty assessing the degree to which they engaged in the processes. Many students have 
poor awareness of their own cognitive process use and may have struggled to report what they 
actually did during the learning phase (Metcalfe, Eich, & Castel, 2010). Evidence from self-
explanation literature is consistent with this general finding. For example, a study that compared 
providing learners with instructional explanations and prompting them to construct explanations 
found that the self-explanation prompts supported greater learning, but participants felt they were 
learning best from provided the instructional explanations (Schworm & Renkl, 2006). 
Consequently, it may be that learners’ responses to the learning process questionnaires reflected 
something related to their performance (e.g., their desire to appear engaged with or effortful in 
their use of the learning materials) but not what they actually did. Prior research also shows that 
not all self-explanations or analogical comparisons lead to robust knowledge. The items focus on 
frequency of use but may not capture variability in the quality of self-explanations or analogical 
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comparisons. In other words, participants who reported engaging in greater levels of comparison 
or self-explanation may not necessarily have engaged in more comparison of structural features 
or self-explanation of principles. Finally, participants might interpret the scale differently, such 
that one participant could have a different standard for what constitutes engaging in a lot of self-
explanation. If participants’ actual behaviors systematically affected their interpretations of the 
scales, such that those who put more effort into following the prompts also developed higher 
criteria for describing their efforts as “a lot,” it could create a confounding relationship between 
participants’ learning processes and their rating judgments.  
Second, why did analogical comparison lead to worse performance, regardless of whether 
it was assigned (through condition) or spontaneous (as reflected in self-reported levels)? Some 
prior work has found similar results on certain types of tasks. Nokes-Malach et al. (2013) found 
that analogical comparison of physics problems led to worse near-transfer problem-solving 
performance compared to self-explanation and instructional explanation conditions, although the 
conditions were equivalent on intermediate-transfer items and the analogical comparison and 
self-explanation conditions outperformed the instructional explanation condition on far-transfer 
items. In the context of category learning, Edwards et al. (2013) found that instructions to 
compare exemplars in a group were less effective than instructions to explain because the 
comparison prompts constrained the types of comparison learners engaged in. More broadly, 
prior work has found that adding scaffolding to analogical comparison activities leads to greater 
learning if the scaffolding identifies key features, as learners may struggle to align structural 
features without guidance (Gentner et al., 2003). Thus, one possible explanation for the negative 
relation between analogical comparison and performance in our work could be that neither the 
experimental manipulation to support analogical comparison nor the learners’ spontaneous 
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comparisons consistently targeted the structural relations that, when aligned, support more 
fruitful comparison. Further analysis of participants’ prompt responses could provide a more 
fine-grained assessment of how well participants’ responses aligned with the types of analogical 
comparison statements thought to support learning of deep concepts and abstract principles. 
Edwards et al. (2013) also found that participants instructed to engage in explanation 
reported greater levels of explanation and comparison when asked to rate their behaviors on a 
single-item scale of 1 to 7. Although these results differ from our findings that neither condition 
reported greater levels of explanation or comparison, they are similar in showing a lack of 
alignment between participants’ self-reported levels of each process and the processes the 
experimental manipulations were intended to support. These results suggest that instructions to 
compare or explain likely alter learners’ behaviors in a broader range of ways and encourage 
changes (or perceived changes) in multiple cognitive processes. It may also be that self-
explanation and analogical comparison prompts led to more variation in what learners did while 
studying the worked examples. If learners in the instructional explanation condition more 
consistently attended to the information in the examples, they might have better learned the basic 
content. Finally, while materials were designed to suppress spontaneous engagement in 
analogical comparison or self-explanation outside of the targeted conditions, it is possible that 
students still engaged in analogical comparison across pages or elaborated on provided 
instructional explanations. 
Third, why were prompt response scores not related to intermediate or far transfer for the 
self-explanation condition or any levels of transfer for the analogical comparison condition? This 
lack of correlation could be explained in at least two ways. It could be that engaging in the 
cognitive processes supported by self-explanation or analogical comparison prompts, as coded 
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by higher rubric scores, did not lead to greater learning. While this would contradict much prior 
work suggesting that self-explanation and analogical comparison support deep, conceptual 
learning, there is also evidence that content being explained or compared and the type of 
knowledge tested affect whether engaging in high-quality self-explanation or analogical 
comparison leads to greater performance.  
Alternatively, it may be that the rubric scoring levels were not optimally aligned with the 
key behaviors and cognitive processes responsible for deep learning through self-explanation and 
analogical comparison. For the self-explanation rubric, generating content that was not already 
stated in the worked examples was the primary difference between low scores and high scores on 
the rubric; however, this approach may have missed another important factor of how closely the 
participants’ responses approached the key principle or principles being communicated in the 
example. That is, some responses receiving a higher score might have included novel content 
that was not relevant to underlying principles, while some lower-scoring responses might have 
stated the key principle clearly but not introduced any novel ideas. The worked examples were 
designed to explain key features of the problem, and thus writing a response that included novel 
content might have indicated in many cases a focus on less important features of the problem.  
In the case of the analogical comparison condition, the coding rubric assigned lower 
scores to responses identifying similarities and/or differences without discussing their 
significance and higher scores that included the significance or concepts highlighted by 
similarities and/or differences. Again, however, this distinction might have missed a factor of 
relevance, such that a critical similarity or difference identified without discussion of 
significance would receive a lower score than an irrelevant similarity or difference identified 
with discussion of its significance. The rubric also gave a higher score if participants identified 
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both a similarity and difference instead of only a similarity or a difference. While there were 
relevant similarities and differences to discuss in each example, there may have been more value 
in identifying a single, critical similarity or difference than in identifying less critical similarities 
and differences.  
For both self-explanation and analogical comparison, revised rubrics that captured how 
well participants’ responses identified the key principle or principles being illustrated in each 
worked example might produce prompt response scores that are more predictive of posttest 
performance. Additionally, some prior work examining self-explanation has focused on classify 
the content of self-explanations rather than scoring its quality, and results from this work suggest 
that certain kinds of content are more effective for promoting the type of conceptual learning that 
facilitates transfer (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007; Berthold & Renkl, 2009; Hausmann et al., 
2009; Renkl, 1997). An alternative approach of classifying the types of self-explanations and 
comparisons thus might be another fruitful path for better understanding the relationship between 
how participants responded to prompts and how they performed across different levels of 
transfer on the posttest. 
Results relating to achievement goals were more consistent with hypotheses. While 
mastery-avoidance goals are often considered to be negative based on their avoidance valence, 
they also entail an emphasis on mastery, or understanding the material relative to what is 
possible or relative to one’s own prior understanding. In prior work using very similar materials, 
I found that mastery-avoidance goals were associated with greater posttest performance (Richey 
& Nokes-Malach, 2013). These results were replicated in the present work, with task-framed 
mastery-avoidance goals being correlated with greater intermediate and PFL transfer. Since 
participants in both experiments were college students who mostly had previously taken a 
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physics course in high school, it is possible that a mastery-avoidance goal directed at avoiding 
the loss of prior understanding can be productive when re-learning material. While it was 
unexpected that instructional explanations would lead to greater endorsement of mastery-
avoidance goals, this may offer further evidence that the self-explanation and analogical 
comparison prompts failed to encourage the kinds of deep, constructive learning behaviors 
associated with mastery goals. It may be that reading thorough explanations led to greater 
mastery because the content emphasized deeper understanding, even without thee constructive 
element of the other instructional techniques.  
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10.0  CONCLUSION 
Across both experiments, few posttest differences emerged between self-explanation and 
analogical comparison conditions. Difference in posttest performance generally involved the 
instructional explanation condition performing better than other conditions, including the 
practice condition (near transfer, Experiment 1) and the analogical comparison condition (overall 
accuracy and PFL transfer, Experiment 2). The only difference between self-explanation and 
analogical comparison conditions was a marginal difference on intermediate-transfer items in 
Experiment 2, on which the self-explanation condition performed better than the analogical 
comparison condition. Thus, results suggest a weak effect such that studying worked examples 
with instructional explanations may have increased learning relative to comparing worked 
examples. 
While theories of instructional explanation and self-explanation generally suggest that 
self-explanation will support deeper learning through its constructive processes, there are several 
caveats. First, self-explanations vary in quality even when they are prompted, and only certain 
types of self-explanations may actually support learning (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007; Berthold 
& Renkl, 2009). While self-explanations do not necessarily need to be complete or accurate to 
promote learning, much evidence suggests they must at least be effortful and involve the 
activation of prior knowledge. Although the coding of prompt responses revealed a range from 
the lowest to greatest number of points possible, even responses earning the largest number of 
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points possible may have lacked the effortful focus on constructing knowledge and identifying 
principles that supports learning from self-explanation.  
It may be that effort is more important for learning from self-explanation than from 
instructional explanations; if that is the case and participants across all conditions employed 
relatively little effort, it could explain why instructional explanations led to more learning. The 
learners may have felt they understood the worked examples sufficiently without engaging in 
effortful self-explanation or analogical comparison. Additionally, some content in the 
instructional text and on the test was not addressed in the worked examples, and participants may 
have skimmed over this content without realizing that it was also important. These possibilities 
are supported anecdotally in participants’ open-ended responses, in which many discussed 
assessing their understanding by whether they were able to solve the practice problems. Most 
participants expressed confidence that they understood the problems, and their performance on 
the practice problems is consistently high; however, many of those participants nevertheless 
struggled with the posttest, which targeted a wider variety of concepts covered in the learning 
materials as well as the worked examples. Future work should include more challenging 
conceptual examples that will produce more failure, thus prompting students to engage more 
deeply in responding to prompts and studying instructional text to understand the worked 
examples. 
Although most participants reported taking a physics course in the past, very few had 
completed a college course. Even with the instructional text provided before each set of worked 
examples, it might be that participants lacked sufficient prior knowledge to make fruitful 
explanations or to engage in revising their prior knowledge. There is less evidence that prior 
knowledge is important for engaging in fruitful analogical comparison (Alfieri et al., 2013), 
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although a learner who lacks sufficient prior knowledge to understand key features of examples 
might be unable to see the structural alignment across cases. In both cases, lacking sufficient 
prior knowledge could have made receiving instructional explanations more effective than trying 
to construct explanations or comparisons. 
An alternative explanation focuses not on the failures of the experiment to promote 
effective self-explanations, but rather on the strength of the instructional explanations condition. 
Instructional explanations have been shown to improve learning from worked examples under 
some conditions (Wittwer & Renkl, 2010), and their primary hypothesized advantage over self-
explanation is that they are complete and accurate. The instructional explanations provided 
across both experiments focused on key principles targeted in the practice and test problems. 
Few participants were able to construct information in the self-explanation or analogical 
comparison conditions that described key principles as completely or accurately as what was 
provided in the instructional explanations condition. Consequently, the benefits of receiving 
complete, accurate instructional explanations might have outweighed the benefits of being 
prompted to construct individualized knowledge through self-explanation or analogical 
comparison prompts. Instructional explanations may be particularly useful when participants 
lack either the prior knowledge or effort necessary to construct explanations or comparisons 
focused on important principles. 
Self-reports of learning processes generally did not align with condition assignments. It is 
possible that this means there was more individual variability in the processes learners engaged 
in compared to variability between conditions. Further investigation of the additional strategies 
participants reported might show other patterns in individual differences outside the processes 
targeted by the learning prompts. It is possible that engagement these other processes might vary 
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by condition, or that they would predict performance on the test. Alternatively, this result may 
reflect learners’ generally poor metacognitive skills when it comes to assessing their own 
learning processes. Despite the lack of alignment between condition assignment and self-
reported strategies, several self-reported strategies were associated with learning outcomes in 
expected ways, including metacognitive behaviors and self-explanation. 
Future work should continue to investigate how analogical comparison and self-
explanation operate individually and through interactions to promote different types of learning. 
Questionnaires capturing specific types and sub-processes of analogical comparison and self-
explanation might improve understanding of how each facilitates different types of learning. By 
improving understanding of similarities and differences between analogical comparison and self-
explanation, I hope to identify concrete recommendations for when and how instructors can 
support each process based on their instructional goals. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROMPTS BY CONDITION 
A.1 EXPERIMENT 1 
A.1.1 Self-explanation 
       a. Instructions 
Now we will move on to some more examples of sequence extrapolation problems. Your task is 
to find the pattern and continue it so the subsequent letters follow the same pattern. You will read 
through some examples of sequence extrapolation problems that have been solved for you. As 
you read through each example, you will be prompted to explain each step. Please think carefully 
about each step and write your explanation in the space provided before moving on to the next 
step. Studying these examples carefully will help you learn how to solve this type of problem. 
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       b. Prompts 
What does this step mean to you? Could you restate or summarize the step in your own words? 
What else does this step tell you? 
 
A.1.2 Analogical comparison 
       a. Instructions 
Now we will move on to some more examples of sequence extrapolation problems. Your task is 
to find the pattern and continue it so the subsequent letters follow the same pattern. You will read 
through some examples of sequence extrapolation problems that have been solved for you.  You 
will see steps for two separate examples at once, and you’ll be prompted to compare across the 
two steps. Please think carefully about each comparison and write your response in the space 
provided before moving on to the next pair of steps. Comparing these examples carefully will 
help you learn how to solve this type of problem. 
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       b. Prompts 
What is similar about this step of the two problems? What is different? What do the similarities 
and differences tell you? 
A.1.3 Instructional explanation 
       a. Instructions 
Now we will move on to some more examples of sequence extrapolation problems. Your task is 
to find the pattern and continue it so the subsequent letters follow the same pattern. You will 
read through some examples of sequence extrapolation problems that have been solved for you. 
Please think carefully about each step. Studying these examples carefully will help you learn 
how to solve this type of problem. 
       b. Instructional explanation 
Example: This step identifies the period of the sequence. Each period is made up of the same set 
of rules. Some letters within a period are determined by their relations to letters in the previous 
period.  After identifying the length of the pattern, you can look across periods to identify the 
rules that determine letters in the following period to continue the pattern. You can also focus on 
just one complete pattern sequence, from the start to the end of the period, to identify the rules 
within the period. This period is six letters long. 
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A.1.4 Practice 
       a. Instructions 
Now we will move on to some more examples of sequence extrapolation problems. Your task is 
to find the pattern and continue it so the subsequent letters follow the same pattern. You will 
read a series of sequence extrapolation and try to solve them one at a time. Please think carefully 
about each problem. Trying to solve these problems will help you learn how to solve this type of 
problem. After you have gotten an answer or solved as much as you can, you can turn the page 
and see the solution to the problem. You can study the solution for as long as you need, but 
please do NOT turn to the solution before you have finished solving the problem. 
       b. Prompt 
Try your best to solve this problem. When you have reached the answer or completed as much as 
you can, proceed to the solution on the next page. 
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A.2 EXPERIMENT 2 
A.2.1 Self-explanations 
a. Instructions 
You will read through a text about electricity and solve some problems. You will also read 
through some examples of problems that have been solved for you. As you read through each 
example, think carefully about each step. You will be prompted to explain the examples after 
you have read each one and write your explanation in the space provided.  
This process employs a learning strategy called self-explanation. Self-explanation 
involves reading a text or example and explaining to yourself what the text means. Past research 
has shown that self-explanation is a powerful tool for learning, but it works best if you take your 
time and explain things as thoroughly as you can.  
There are many types of self-explanation that can be useful, including monitoring your 
comprehension, making bridging inferences to link separate ideas in the text or examples, and 
elaborating by using prior knowledge and logic to understand the text. Different types may be 
more appropriate at different times depending on what the content is and how it relates to what 
you already know and what your goals are. 
In the following pages, try to apply these different tools to self-explain as you read the 
text and study worked examples. Take notes in the margins of the text when it is helpful. You’ll 
be prompted to write out your self-explanations when you encounter worked examples. For the 
first few examples, you will receive specific instructions to help you get started. 
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b. Modeling 
Here are some examples of self-explanations that you might generate in response to the worked 
example: 
Monitoring: Thinking about your comprehension and identifying what you don’t understand 
Example: “This problem seems to depend on understanding what ‘uncharged’ means. I’m not 
sure I remember reading that term. What does “uncharged’ mean?” 
 
Bridging: Linking to other ideas in the text 
Example: “So ‘uncharged’ here might mean the same thing as ‘electrically neutral,’ which is 
when the number of electrons and protons are equal. This means uncharged substances have the 
same number of protons and electrons, and when they lose or gain electrons they become 
charged.” 
Elaboration: Making connections between the text and things you already know (e.g., creating 
examples based on prior knowledge), or making logical inferences to understand the text 
Example: “The text said that hair and a balloon are attracted to each other after electrons transfer 
from the hair to the balloon. In this case, electrons transfer from the rod to the silk, so they 
should be attracted to each other, too.” 
c. Prompts 
Self-explain the reasoning or justification for this solution. Write out words to describe any 
symbols, and provide conceptual justifications and principled reasoning to explain the solution. 
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A.2.2 Analogical comparison 
a. Instructions 
You will read through a text about electricity and solve some problems. You will also read 
through some examples of problems that have been solved for you. As you read through each 
example, think carefully about each step. You will be prompted to compare the examples after 
you have read each one and write your comparison in the space provided.  
This process employs a learning strategy called analogical comparison. Analogical 
comparison involves aligning features of different pieces of information or examples and 
mapping the similarities between them. Past research has shown that analogical comparison is a 
powerful tool for learning, but it works best if you take your time and make productive 
comparisons.  
As you make comparisons, try to focus on features that are critical to the concepts or 
solution principle. Focusing on such features helps learners to identify and understand critical 
information. In contrast, focusing on features that are not critical to the concepts being used or 
the problem-solving procedures may cause you to remember unimportant or superficial details 
instead of important, structural information.  
It is often useful to notice important differences as well as similarities between cases. As 
you read the text and study the examples, try to identify key features to compare ideas in the text 
and worked examples. Take notes in the margins of the text when it is helpful. You’ll be 
prompted to write out your analogical comparisons when you encounter worked examples. For 
the first few examples, you will receive specific instructions to help you get started. 
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b. Modeling 
Remember, analogical comparison involves aligning features of different pieces of information, 
and it is most useful if you focus on features that are critical to the concepts or solution 
principle. Here is an example of a comparison of critical information. 
Similarities: “Both worked examples deal with the idea of electron transfer. In both cases, one 
substance is losing electrons and the other is gaining electrons. In both, the substance that loses 
electrons becomes positively charged and the substance that gains electrons becomes negatively 
charged.” 
It is also good to abstract the details of the problems and think about the general 
principle demonstrated across problems. 
Abstraction: “These problems illustrate that electrons can move within or between substances, 
and the creation of charged objects results from this electron movement.” 
Try NOT to focus on superficial similarities and differences, such as the detail that one 
example deals with silk and glass and the other example deals with a balloon and sweater. These 
features are not critical to the concepts or solution principles being applied.  
Can you identify any other similarities that are relevant to the concepts applied in these 
problems? Write them here: 
c. Prompts 
What is similar across problems? What is different? What do the similarities and differences tell 
you about the concepts involved? 
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A.2.3 Instructional explanation 
a. Instructions 
You will read through a text about electricity and solve some problems. You will also read 
through some examples of problems that have been solved for you. As you read through each 
example, think carefully about each step. You will also receive conceptual justifications for each 
step. 
This process employs a learning strategy called worked example study. Worked 
examples demonstrate correct problem-solving steps to help you solve similar problems. While 
simply seeing a solution to a problem can be helpful, it is often more beneficial for learners to 
see the procedures and rules applied at each step to solve a problem, so they learn not only what 
the correct answer is but also how to get it. Past research has shown that worked examples are a 
powerful tool for learning, but they work best if you take your time and study each example as 
thoroughly as you can. 
 
In the following pages, read the text and take your time to study each worked example. 
Take notes in the margins of the text when it is helpful. 
b. Instructional explanations 
Example: 
General principle applied: The relationship between protons and electrons determines the 
charge of the atom. 
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Define values and relations: A material usually cannot gain or lose protons, but it can gain or 
lose electrons. The number of protons AND the number of electrons must be known to determine 
charge. 
Solve based on values and principle: If there are more protons than electrons, the material is 
positively charged. If there are more electrons than protons, the material is negatively charged. 
c. Prompts 
Remember to take your time and study each worked example carefully. Studying worked 
examples can improve your learning of the concepts and solutions. 
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APPENDIX B 
DICTIONARIES CREATED FOR LIWC ANALYSIS 
Table 14.  
LIWC dictionary words for cognitive processes. 
Compare Explain Example 
study 
abstract* describe* answer* 
across elaborate* problem* 
align* example* procedure* 
alike explain* read 
analog* explan* re-read 
between infer* solution* 
common justif* step* 
compar* myself studi* 
differ* past Study 
map* previous*  
oppos* prior  
relate* reason*  
relating restat*  
same why  
share* self  
similar*   
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Table 15.  
LIWC dictionary words for metacognitive processes. 
Monitor Control Evaluate 
knew adjust* answer* 
know* change* evaluat* 
monitor* changing outcome* 
notice* control* response 
noticing plan review* 
progress plann* sense 
recogni* plans solution* 
test rethink*  
tested strateg*  
testing   
tests   
think*   
thought*   
understand*   
understood   
unknown*   
unsure*   
 
 
Table 16.  
LIWC dictionary words for achievement goals. 
Mastery Performance Approach 
capab* appear accomplish* 
competen* correct acquir* 
ideal* demonstrate achiev* 
knew error attain* 
know* incorrect beat 
knowledg* grade best 
learn* look better 
master* mistake* excel* 
past others gain* 
perfect* perform* good 
possible right improve* 
potential* score improving 
previous* show succeed 
prior wrong success 
self  top 
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understand*  well 
  win 
  winn* 
  wins 
  won 
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